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FINDING A LEGAL REMEDY FOR THE HIV-
POSITIVE INFANT: WRONGFUL LIFE AND
LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT EXPLORED
The AIDS' epidemic has had a devastating effect on society.2 It
has affected a large number of women and children who have con-
tracted the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).3 Women com-
prised an estimated ten percent of the AIDS known cases in the
United States at the beginning of the 1990's. 4 As a result, there
were approximately three thousand cases of pediatric AIDS
known by the end of 1991.1 As the end of the twentieth century
1 See BLACi's LAw DICTIONARY 69 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLAcK's]. Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome is "a virus which attacks a person's immune system and dam-
ages his or her ability to fight other diseases. Without a functioning immune system to
ward off other germs, person becomes vulnerable to becoming infected by bacteria, fungi,
and other viruses and malignancies which may cause life-threatening illness[.]" Id.; see
also James D. Hegarty et al., The Medical Care Costs of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infected Children in Harlem, J. AM. MED. ASS'N, Oct. 7, 1988, at 1901. Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome is colloquially known as AIDS. Id.
2 See generally Robert H. DuRant et al., High School Students' Knowledge of HIV/AIDS
and Perceived Risk of Currently Having AIDS, AM. SCH. HEALTH ASSN J. OF ScH. HEALTH,
Feb. 1992, at 59 (analyzing levels of correct knowledge of cause, spread and prevention of
HIV infection); Preventing HIVIAIDS in Adolescents; Human Immunodeficiency Virus; Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, AM. SCH. HEALTH Ass'N J. SCH. HEALTH, Jan. 1994, at
39 [hereinafter Preventing HIVIAIDS] (surveying broad range of topics as they relate to
AIDS and adolescents, including adolescent developmental issues, youth in high-risk situa-
tions and youth who use alcohol and drugs); The Family: Growing Up Gay, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 13, 1986, at 3 (discussing difficulties for young homosexuals when "the AIDS epidemic
casts its shadow").
3 See HIV Infection, Pregnant Women, and Newborns: A Policy Proposal for Information
and Testing. (Human Immunodeficiency Virus), J. AM. MED. ASS'N, Nov. 14, 1990, at 2416
[hereinafter H1V Infection] (discussing growth of HIV virus in women and children); see
also Salynn Boyles, Transmission (HIV) 15,000 Kids in U.S. Infected By Their Mothers,
AIDS WKLY., Oct. 16, 1995 (noting that approximately 6,530 HIV infected women gave
birth in United States in 1993); Gabriella Scarlatti, Pediatric HIV Infection (HIV Series),
LANCET, Sept. 28, 1996, at 863 (estimating 1.5 million children were infected with HIV by
1994 and by 2000 there will be 5-10 million children infected with HV).
4 See HIV Infection, supra note 3, at 2416 (estimating approximately 30% of HIV positive
mothers will pass virus on to their children); see also Howard L. Minkoff & Jack A.
DeHowitz, Care of Women Infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, J. AM. MED.
Ass'N, Oct. 23, 1991, at 2253 (quoting Surgeon General Report that rate of AIDS-infected
women has increased 29%, with women comprising over 11% of AIDS cases in United
States and further estimating three million women will die of AIDS in this decade);
Scarlatti, supra note 3, at 863 (evaluating rate of mother-child transmission of HIV at 13%-
42%).
5 See HIV Infection, supra note 3, at 2416 (discussing percentage of population infected
with HIV); see also Sunny Rosenfeld, Developments in Custody Options for HPV-Positive
Parents, 11 BERKELEY WoMN's L.J. 194, 195 (1996) (maintaining by year 2000, somewhere
between 32,000 and 38,000 HIV-positive children will have been born to HIV-positive
women).
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approaches, the number of infants infected with HIV continues to
increase.6 Legal concerns7 relating to the epidemic are as numer-
ous as medical concerns. 8
The fate of an HIV-positive infant is particularly tragic.9 Since
his or her mother is usually HIV-positive,' the likelihood of that
mother's death, soon after the infant's birth, is disproportionately
high. Many of these mothers are poor;" as a result care of infected
6 See The New Frankness in AIDS Ads, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1994, at A18 (discussing
dramatic affect of AIDS epidemic on infants and children in recent years); see also Boyles,
supra note 3 (stating approximately 15,000 children in United States were prenatally in-
fected with HIV in 1994 and adding as of 1995, approximately 12,000 of those children
were still alive); Juliet J. McKenna, Where Ignorance is Not Bliss: A Proposal for
Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant Women, 7 STAN. L. POL'Y REV. 133, 135 (1996) (citing
1994 Centers for Disease Control report, author states in 1994, reported pediatric AIDS
cases increased 8% from 1993, totaling 6,209 reported cases by beginning of 1995); Rosen-
feld, supra note 5, at 195 (predicting number of children who will be born to HIV-positive
women); Kevin J. Cumin, Note, Newborn HIV Screening and New York Assembly Bill No.
6747-B: Privacy and Equal Protection of Pregnant Women, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857, 858
(1994) (stating twenty million children will be affected by HIV/AIDS by year 2000).
7 See Jean R. Stem Light, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a
Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707,
713 (1996). Another thought provoking concern is that of mandatory HIV testing of preg-
nant women. Id.; James M. Smith, AIDS, HIV Hit Families with Wide Range of Legal
Problems, CHI. DAILY L. BuLL., Nov. 12, 1991, at 2. Among these legal concerns are issues
of family law, such as custody, guardianship and foster care. Id.
8 See Smith, supra note 7, at 2. Medical concerns may include insurance, public benefits
and health care. Id. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 217, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 726 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1988). It has been suggested that the discrimination, stigmatization and
mass hysteria surrounding AIDS have been veiled as medical issues and the courts should
repudiate such allegations. Id.; Elliott B. Oppenheim, Physicians as Experts Against Their
Own Patients? What Happened to the Privilege?, 63 DEF. COUNs. J. 254, 257 (1996). An
alarming concern is patient medical record confidentiality and the protection of doctor-pa-
tient privilege. Id.
9 See John F. Hernandez, Perinatal Transmission of HIV: Cause for the Resurrection of
Wrongful Life, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 393, 394-95 (1994). "HIV-positive newborns, per-
haps the most 'innocent' of all HIV-positive individuals, generally live short, tortured lives
necessitating expensive and intrusive medical intervention." Id.; see also Josephine Gittler
and Merle McPherson, M.D., HIV Infection Among Women of Reproductive Age, Children
and Adolescents, 77 IowA L. REV. 1283, 1298-99 (1992). The authors discuss the mortality
rate of AIDS and assert that by 1997 AIDS may be the fifth leading cause of death among
children. Id.
10 See HIV Infection, supra note 3, at 2416 (stating that in most cases infants acquired
HIV virus through vertical transmission from their mothers); see also Leonardo Renna,
New York State's Proposal to Unblind HIV Testing For Newborns: A Necessary Step in Ad-
dressing a Critical Problem, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 411 (1994) (noting that in 93% of cases
involving HIV-positive children, transmission was perinatal); C. Rouzioux et al., Estimated
Timing of Mother-to-Child Human Immunodefiency Virus Type 1 (HIV.1) Transmission by
Use of a Markov Model, AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY, Dec. 15, 1995, at 1330 (discussing that trans-
mission of HIV-1 from mother to child can occur during pregnancy and at delivery and
further estimating that one-third of infected infants are infected in utero and remaining
are infected on day of birth).
11 See HIV Infection, supra note 3, at 2416 (noting "HIV disproportionately affects disad-
vantaged women and children of color"); see also Gittler & McPherson, supra note 9, at
1310 n.145 (citing Margaret Heagerty, Pediatric AIDS, Poverty and National Priorities,
145 Am. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 521, 527 (1991) (discussing difficulty for poor families to get
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infants may fall on already overburdened social institutions.12
The cost of caring for "boarder babies"13 is extraordinary' 4 and the
cost of caring for HIV-positive infants even greater.1
5
Some cases of HIV-infected newborns have resulted from the
negligence of health care providers. 16 Specifically, health care
providers may inaccurately administer an HIV test or fail to in-
form a woman that she should take an HIV test. i v The tort action
of wrongful life'" is not available to these infants in New York.
medical care from disorganized and fragmented series of supports for poor); Rev. Raymond
C. O'Brien, A Legislative Initiative: The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emer-
gency Act of 1990, 7 J. COMTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 183, 183 (1991) (asserting that, after
ten years post-recognition, AIDS has affected more of poor, urban population); Laurie Ru-
binstein, Prosecuting Maternal Substance Abusers: An Unjustified and Ineffective Policy, 9
YALE L. & POL'v REV. 130, 141-42 (1991) (indicating that poor women are more closely
focused upon in medical studies).
12 See Hernandez, supra note 9, at 395 (arguing for tort remedy for HIV-positive infants
in light of impact on social institutions).
13 Id. at 410 n.10 (noting parents who are unable to or unwilling to care for "boarder
babies" abandon them at hospitals). See Thomas J. Downey and George Miller, Ten Years
Later: Foster Care Again, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 10, 1990, at 18 (noting term
"boarder babies" evolved from nature of problem-children "boarded" in hospitals after be-
ing abandoned by "parents too sick or strung out to care for them"); Hegarty, supra note 1,
at 1901 (discussing costs of caring for HIV newborns).
14 See Hegarty, supra note 1, at 1901 (estimating total cost of caring for boarder baby
was $466.00 per day, according to 1988 study at Harlem Hospital); see also Paul J. Dono-
hue, Federal Tax Treatment of Health Care Expenditures: Is it Part of the Health Care
Problem?, 46 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 141, 163-64 (discussing financial impact of
current health care practices and proposing alternatives, such as preventative care at gov-
ernment expense); Suzanne Sangree, Control of Childbearing by HIV-Positive Women:
Some Responses to Emerging Legal Policies, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 309, 314 n.14 (estimating
annual cost in 1989 of caring for AIDS babies was $1 billion).
15 See Hegarty, supra note 1, at 1901. The Harlem Hospital study estimated that the
total cost of caring for an HIV-positive infant was $705.00 a day. Id.
16 See Cathy J. Jones, College Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to
Play, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 113, 120-21 (1992) (advocating doctrine of informed consent, author
provides that health care provider must be liable for medical malpractice if negligent in
disclosing or administering treatment); Jill Y. Miller, Mom Not Told of Her HIV, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 14, 1992, at 8 [hereinafter Mom Not Told] (discussing case where patient tested posi-
tive for HIV, but was not informed of result until after she was seven months pregnant
with her child, born HIV-positive). See, e.g., Anastosopoulos v. Perakis, 644 A.2d 480, 481
(Me. 1994) (explaining that though physician was aware of patient's prior sexual history
and history of intravenous drug use, physician failed to recommend HIV test, resulting in
mother's lack of information to decide whether to abort child, who was born HIV-positive.)
17 See, e.g., Newman v. Flaten, 618 So. 2d 374, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing
case where mother not told of HIV-positive test results and subsequently gave birth to
HIV-positive infant).
18 See BLAci's, supra note 1, at 1613. The term "wrongful life" is often used interchange-
ably with the terms "wrongful birth" and "wrongful conception" or "wrongful diagnosis." Id.
The tort action of "wrongful life" is a "medical malpractice claim brought on behalf of a
child born with birth defects, alleging that the child would not have been born but for negli-
gent advice to, or treatment of, the parents." Id. Wrongful life is distinguished from a
"wrongful birth" claim, which the parents of a child bring "alleging that negligent treat-
ment or advice deprived them of the opportunity to avoid conception or terminate the preg-
nancy." Id. at 1612. It also differs from a "wrongful conception" or "wrongful diagnosis"
claim which "aris[es] from the negligent performance of a sterilization procedure or abor-
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While wrongful life claims are not statutorily prohibited, 19 the
companion cases of Becker v. Schwartz20 and Park v. Chessin2 1 ef-
fectively restrict such actions in New York State. Although other
jurisdictions have had occasion to address wrongful life actions in
the context of HIV-positive infants,22 New York courts have not.
New York, however, does have a statutory cause of action 21 for
lack of informed consent, providing a viable remedy in some cases
of HIV-positive infants.
Part One of this Note will explore whether an HIV-positive in-
fant, infected due to the negligence of a health care provider, has a
tort remedy in New York. This Note will show that when a physi-
cian negligently performs an HIV test on a mother, the infant
born HIV-positive should have a remedy in wrongful life. Part
Two will examine the liability surrounding a physician who fails
to recommend that a patient take an HIV test, given his or her
knowledge of the patient's history. This Note will conclude that
although New York courts have prohibited wrongful life actions,
children born with HIV could have a viable cause of action for
wrongful life or lack of informed consent.
tion." Id.; see also Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,404, 386 N.E.2d 807, 810, 413 N.Y.S.
2d 895, 898 (1978). "[Tlhe term 'wrongful life' has functioned as a broad umbrella under
which plaintiffs alleging factually diverging wrongs have sought judicial recognition." Id.;
Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 531 (N.C. 1985). Wrongful life is a claim for relief of
parents and their children for negligent medical treatment or advice which deprives the
parents of the opportunity to abort a fetus to prevent birth of an impaired child. Id. See
generally Oscar Leroy Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts § 82.09 (Matthew
Bender 1990). A discussion of the various claims that fall under the term "wrongful life" are
provided therein. Id.
19 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1996). The wrongful life ac-
tion has sprung out of the New York statute for wrongful death. Id. This statute provides
that the personal representative of a decedent, who is survived by distributees, may main-
tain an action to recover damages for wrongful conduct which caused the decedent's death
against a person who caused the wrongful conduct. Id.; see also Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 532.
This court held a wrongful life claim is not cognizable in the law because there is no injury
when a child is impaired, as opposed to a child never born. Id.
20 46 N.Y.2d 401, 409, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899 (1978) (prohibiting
wrongful life claim).
21 Id. (holding that plaintiffs failed to state legally cognizable claims).
22 See Newman, 618 So. 2d at 375 (appealing from lower court's dismissal of wrongful
life claim); Anastosopoulos v. Perakis, 644 A.2d 480, 481 (Me. 1994) (discussing case in
which doctors failed to recommend former prostitute and intravenous drug user take HIV
test and both mother and subsequently born child developed AIDS); Claim by Boy Born
with AIDS To Go To Trial, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Feb. 9, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Claim by
Boy] (discussing Anastosopoulos case); Jill Y. Miller, Mother Sues for Not Being Told She
Had HIV-Case Shows the Newness of AIDS Litigation, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 2,
1992, at A41 [hereinafter Mother Sues] (discussing Newman case).
23 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1996) (providing cause of action for
lack of informed consent).
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I. CLAIMING WRONGFUL LIFE: A LEGALLY COGNIZABLE ACTION
A wrongful life action, brought on behalf of an impaired in-
fant,24 is a claim sounding in negligence. 25 The plaintiff seeks a
remedy for the actual birth of that child. 26 A successful action for
wrongful life requires the plaintiff to prove the elements of negli-
gence.27 Most courts, including New York, have typically found it
to be impossible to show duty, breach, causation and damages. 28
Public policy concerns for HIV-positive infants 29 suggest that
there should be a resolution of the traditional arguments 30 re-
stricting wrongful life claims in favor of infected infants.
24 See Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 532 (defining wrongful life as alleging that child would not
have been born but for negligent advice to, or treatment of, parents); BLAc's, supra note 1,
at 1613 (defining wrongful life); see also Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 853 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1963) (recognizing wrongful life cause of action); Hernandez, supra note 9, at 394 (as-
serting HIV infected infant can claim wrongful life cause of action).
25 See Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1148 (Md. 1993) (noting general negligence
rules apply in malpractice cases); see also Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 819,
364 N.E.2d 1340, 1341, 396, N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (1977) (denying wrongful life claim because
there was no breach of duty); Duffey v. Fear, 121 A.D. 2d 928, 930-31, 505 N.Y.S. 2d 136,
139-40 (1st Dept 1986) (analyzing wrongful life claim in framework of negligence); James
Bopp, Jr., The 'Rights' and 'Wrongs' of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: A Jurispruden-
tial Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 461, 462 (1989) (noting that in wrong-
ful life alleged negligence consists of childs claim that existence is legal wrong due to doc-
tor's failure to test, detect, or warn of fatal defects); Hernandez, supra note 9, at 399
(reasoning that conventional negligence tort analysis of duty, breach, causation and dam-
ages applies to cause of action for wrongful life).
26 See BLAci's, supra note 1, at 1613 (defining wrongful life); see also Bopp, supra note
25, at 462 (asserting wrongful life claim seeks to compensate for birth of child); Al Trotzig,
The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 14 FAM. L.Q. 15,
18 (1980) (defining remedies for wrongful life and wrongful birth causes of action).
27 PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 131 (John W. Wade
et al. eds., 9th ed. 1994) [hereinafter PROSSER]. The traditional elements of negligence are:
duty to use reasonable care; breach of the duty; causal connection between conduct and
injury, and; loss or damage. Id.
28 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895, 900 (1978) (denying recovery for failure to prove damages); Johnson, 42 N.Y.2d at 819,
364 N.E.2d at 1341, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 648 (denying recovery for failure to prove breach of
duty); Duffey, 121 A.D.2d at 930-31, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 139 (holding physician did not breach
standard of care).
29 See Boyles, supra note 3 (estimating HIV infection in children); HIV Infection, supra
note 3, at 2416 (discussing growth of HIV virus in women and children); Minkoff &
DeHowitz, supra note 4, at 2253 (estimating rise in women infected with HIV); Rosenfeld,
supra note 5, at 195 (estimating number of children infected with HIV); Scarlatti, supra
note 3, at 863 (discussing growing number of children infected with HIV).
30 See Bopp, supra note 25, at 461-73 (discussing supporting arguments for wrongful life
actions).
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A. Allowance of Wrongful Life Actions
In a Florida case, Sophie Newman was not informed31 that the
HIV test32 administered to her came back positive.3 3 After becom-
ing pregnant,34 her obstetrician tested her for HIV, again yielding
positive results. 5 Ms. Newman sued for wrongful life on behalf of
the infant and the circuit court dismissed the action. 6 The court
held the complaint did not state a cause of action under Florida
law, which does not recognize wrongful life actions.
Like Florida, New York courts would also prohibit the Newman
infant's wrongful life claim. Other jurisdictions, however, have
shown some movement toward recognition of wrongful life.3 9 For
example, a Washington court found, in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc.,4 that a wrongful life plaintiff could prove the elements of
31 See Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41 (noting Ms. Newman collapsed while at work,
requiring trip to hospital); see also Renna, supra note 10, at 408 (noting that, as of 1994,
New York State did test all newborns for HIV, but results were blinded and never revealed
to doctors or mothers); HIV Testing Ruling Clears Way for Testing of Newborns for HIV,
AIDS WKLY., June 3, 1996 [hereinafter HIV Testing Ruling] (asserting that regulations
allow health care providers to provide HIV test results to mothers and counsel pregnant
women about HIV transmission and mothers to decide whether or not they would like to be
told of babies' HIV test results).
32 See Mom Not Told, supra note 16, at 8 (noting numerous tests were administered,
including HIV test); see also Jill Y. Miller, Diagnosis of HIV Brings Lawsuit-Florida Wo-
man Says She Was Not Told About Condition Before Pregnancy, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Aug.
9, 1992 [hereinafter Diagnosis of HIV] (discussing administration of tests in Newman case).
33 See Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41. Ms. Newman saw her physician for a dozen
follow-up visits after her hospital stay, but still did not learn the results of the HIV test. Id.
She later developed a fungus in her mouth and sought the advice of her obstetrician. Id.
34 See id. Ms. Newman was seven months pregnant before she learned she was HIV-
positive. Id.
35 See id. at A41 (noting child did not test HIV-positive at birth); see also Newman v.
Flaten, 618 So. 2d 374, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (appealing from lower court's dismis-
sal of wrongful life claim). See generally Locals Please Understand She has HIV, Her
Mother is Dying of AIDS, Can't She Just Be a Little Girl, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL,
Dec. 4, 1994, at 1A [hereinafter Locals Please] (detailing story of newborn and her mother
with AIDS).
36 See Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41 (dismissing claim against both her physician
and North Broward Hospital District); see also Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla.
1992) (finding wrongful life is not part of Florida tort law)..
37 See Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41. Defendants argued that damages were purely
speculative and the action is a "'thinly disguised cause of action for "wrongful life"... the
unmistakable thrust of the claim is that [the child] should not have been born'." Id.; see also
Newman, 618 So. 2d at 375. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
the Newman cause of action. Id.
38 See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d, 401, 410, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
899 (1978) (prohibiting wrongful life claim).
39 See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982) (finding recovery of extraordinary
expenses in wrongful life possible); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1161
(La. 1988) (allowing recovery of extraordinary expenses in wrongful life); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1983) (holding wrongful life is valid claim).
40 656 P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1983) (holding wrongful life is valid claim).
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negligence and recover the extraordinary expenses related to med-
ical care for a defect. 4' Similarly, a Louisiana court found (in Pitre
v. Opelousas General Hospital)42 that if the infant's injury was
foreseeable at the time the defendant treated the mother, the in-
fant may recover extraordinary expenses.43 California also has
recognized that in some cases a severe debilitating defect may be
worse than nonexistence,44 though calculation of such damages is
too speculative.45 Special damages, however, were recoverable.46
Certainly New York courts may look to these jurisdictions in re-
viewing wrongful life claims and award special damages to the
HIV-positive infant.
B. New York's Position on Wrongful Life Actions
New York effectively eliminated wrongful life claims in the com-
panion cases of Becker v. Schwartz4" and Park v. Chessin.48 In
Becker, Dolores Becker claimed her physician never advised her to
take an amniocentesis test to determine whether her unborn child
was afflicted with Down's Syndrome.49 In Park, Mrs. Park gave
birth to a child with polycystic kidney disease.5" After the physi-
cian informed the Parks5 1 that the chances they would conceive a
second child with the same disease were "practically nil," 2 Mrs.
41 Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 479 (finding that since parents may recover expenses for child's
extraordinary care in wrongful birth, it is anomalous to deny same recovery to child).
42 530 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (La. 1988) (allowing recovery of extraordinary expenses in
wrongful life).
43 Pitre, 530 So. 2d at 1157 (recognizing that doctors owe duty to infants not yet con-
ceived if harm to them is foreseeable).
44 Turpin, 643 P.2d at 962-63 (finding it is possible for short life with severe, debilitating
defects to be worse than non-existence).
45 Id. at 963 (denying recovery of general damages based on inability to accurately
assess).
46 Id. at 965 (noting that parents, if able, may sue for extraordinary expenses in wrong-
ful birth action, so child should be able to recover in wrongful life action).
47 Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 410, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899
(1978) (prohibiting wrongful life claim).
48 Id. (holding that plaintiffs failed to state legally cognizable claims).
49 Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 808-09 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97. An amniocentesis test is
often used on women over 35 years of age to detect a higher risk of Down's Syndrome to an
unborn child. Id.
50 Id. (noting child died after five hours); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 81, 400 N.Y.S.2d
110, 111 (2d Dep't 1977) (discussing, in detail, facts of these actions).
51 Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. The Parks ex-
pressed concern to their physician that a second child would be similarly affected. Id.
52 ld. (discussing wrongful life action); Park, 60 A.D.2d at 81, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111 (dis-
cussing assertion of facts at trial).
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Park's second child also was afflicted.53 Both couples commenced
wrongful life actions on behalf of their children. 4
The Court of Appeals of New York held that wrongful life is not
a valid claim, 5 finding two flaws to the action.56 First, the infants
did not suffer a legally cognizable injury.57 The court found that
the "mystery""8 of whether impaired life is worse than nonexis-
tence is better left "to the philosophers and the theologians."59
Second, the court reasoned that a negligence remedy places an in-
jured party in the position he or she would have occupied but for
the negligence of the defendant.6 ° Since the infants would not
have existed but for the negligence of the defendants, calculation
of damages was too speculative. 6' The Becker/Park court felt this
was a matter best left to the legislature.62 To date, New York has
yet to promulgate a statute affording a wrongful life remedy to an
impaired infant.63
53 Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 407, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897. The child died after
two and one half years. Id.
54 Id. The Becker's also commenced an action in their own right to recover damages for
long-term institutional care of the child, damages for Mrs. Becker's emotional and physical
injuries and damages suffered by Mr. Becker for loss of consortium and medical expenses
incurred. Id. The Appellate Division modified Mr. Becker's claim, limiting it to loss of serv-
ices based upon his wife's mental anguish and distress. Id. at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 898. The Court did not allow recovery for psychic and emotional damages. Id.
at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. The Becker Court did allow recovery for
extraordinary expenses. Id. The Parks also sued for the expenses incurred for care of their
child, emotional and physical injuries suffered by both Mr. and Mrs. Park, loss of consor-
tium on behalf of Mr. Park and wrongful death. Id. See Park, 60 A.D.2d at 82-84, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 111-12. The Appellate Division dismissed the wrongful life claim and all claims
for mental anguish and emotional distress. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
55 Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 403-09, 386 N.E.2d at 808-11, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896-99. The Becker
court did allow recovery for all claims related to extraordinary expenses incurred as a re-
sult of negligence and remanded the actions for a liability determination. Id. at 408, 386
N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
56 Id. at 807 (discussing claims set forth before court).
57 Id. at 411 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (quoting Park "There is no prece-
dent for the recognition at the Appellate Division of 'the fundamental right of a child to be
born as a whole, functional human being'." Id.
58 Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898 (discussing "mys-
tery" of whether impaired life was better than nonexistence).
59 Id. (leaving issue of damages to "philosophers and theologians").
60 Id. (determining calculation of damages too speculative).
61 Id. The calculation of damages is "dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson's
choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence. This comparison the law is not
equipped to make." Id.
62 Id. at 412 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d, at 901 (leaving wrongful life issue to
legislature).
63 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1996) (setting forth New
York's wrongful death statute).
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C. Resolving Wrongful Life in Favor of An HIV-Positive Infant
If an infant is infected with HIV due to a health care provider's
improper administration of an HIV test64 or failure to inform the
mother of the test results,65 that infant should be able to claim
wrongful life.66
1. Breach of a Duty to an Unborn Child
The wrongful life plaintiff must first show the defendant owed
him or her a duty.67 Historically, courts have held that a physician
treating a pregnant woman has no duty to the unborn child .6
64 See R.J. and P.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 625 So. 2d 116, 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (discussing case where patient was informed he was HIV positive, when indeed he
was not); see also Sylvia Mayer Baker, HIV Reasons To Apply Traditional Methods Of
Disease Control To The Spread Of HlV, 29 Hous. L. REV. 891, 892 (1992) (discussing risk of
false results in HIV testing); Taunya L. Banks and Roger R. McFadden, Rush To Judg-
ment: HIV Test Reliability And Screening, 23 TuLsA L.J. 1, 7 (1987) (discussing reliability
of AIDS testing).
65 See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAw § 2500-f (McKinney 1996) (requiring New York to set up
comprehensive program for disclosure and administration of HIV tests); Newman v.
Flaten, 618 So. 2d 374, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (appealing from Circuit Court for
Broward County); Chambarry v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 161 Misc. 2d 1000, 1002-03, 615 N.Y.S.
2d 830, 832-33 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994) (discussing case where patient never informed
of possible HIV infection through blood transfusion). See, e.g., Diagnosis of HIV, supra note
32 (commenting on Newman's plight); Mom Not Told, supra note 16, at 8 (discussing New-
man's expectations); Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41 (discussing Sophie Newman's com-
ment, "[it sounds stupid, and maybe we take everything for granted, but I just assumed he
would tell me ... [y]ou have a trust in people, and that's what it came down to").
6 See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961-62 (Cal. 1982) (validating child's wrongful life
claim, court asserted that awarding damages to severely defective child would not disavow
sanctity of life); see also Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984) (vali-
dating wrongful life claim); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488 (Wash. 1983)
(holding children could maintain action for wrongful life); Hernandez, supra note 9, at 401-
06 (discussing wrongful life and AIDS); Bernadette Kennedy, The Trend Toward Judicial
Recognition Of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 UCLA L. REV. 473, 473-500 (1983)
(arguing against wrongful life cause of action). But see also Bopp, supra note 25, at 461-73
(providing critical analysis supporting wrongful life cause of action).
67 PROSSER, supra note 27, at 131. An actor must 'conform to a certain standard of con-
duct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks." Id.; see also United States v.
Caroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 186 (2d Cir. 1947). The court set out the negligence
formula and noted that defendant owes plaintiff a duty of care. Id.; Merluzzi v. Larson, 610
P.2d 739, 742 (Nev. 1980). Duty is an obligation to behave with a particular standard of
conduct towards others. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965). A risk is unrea-
sonable if "a reasonable man would recognize [it] as involving a risk of harm to another."
Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 292 (1965). The risk must outweigh the utility of
the act based upon the social value of the act, the extent the risk will advance the social
value and whether there is another less dangerous course of conduct. Id.
68 See generally John C. Wunsch, Parental Recovery for Loss of Society of the Unborn:
The Plaintiffs Perspective, 77 ILL. B.J. 538, 544 (1989) (discussing wrongful life actions for
unborn child). See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 141 (D. D.C. 1946) (questioning
anomaly of"[w]hy a human being, under the civil law, and a non-entity under the common
law?"); Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15 (1884) (controlling case
for number of years, holding unborn infant does not have separate cause of action as sepa-
rate plaintiff), overruled by Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 525 (W. Va. 1995); Gleitman v.
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Lack of duty, however, no longer defeats a wrongful life claim in
New York.6 9 Judicial allowance of a wide range of derivative
suits70 is indicative of the trend to permit third party recovery.7 1
Applicable to the wrongful life discussion, courts now recognize72
a physician's duty to a pregnant patient extends to the viable fe-
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) (discussing reasonable stan-
dard of care for disclosure of defects to mother who contracted German measles during her
first trimester); Albala v. City of New York, 78 A.D.2d 389, 391, 434 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (1st
Dep't) (stating damages are subject "to the limitations that recovery may not be had for
such injuries when the wrong is committed against another"), affd, 54 N.Y.2d. 269, 429
N.E. 2d 786, 445 N.Y.S. 2d 108 (1981); Khan v. HIP Hosp., Inc., 487 N.Y.S. 2d 700, 704
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985) (holding physicians did not violate standard of care because
duty did not extend to unborn infant).
69 See Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ind. 1992) (concluding physician owes duty
of care to unborn child); Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 691-92 (citing State by Smith v. Brennan, 31
N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.D.2d 497, 503 (1960)) (establishing that there is right for infant to sue
for prenatal torts); Bopp, supra note 25, at 479 (citing W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 367, 368 (5th ed. 1984)) (noting that, beginning in 1946, courts be-
gan to recognize action for prenatal injuries as long as child was born alive). But see Tobin
v. Grossman, 24 N.E. 2d 609, 609, 249 N.Y.2d 419, 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 554 (1969) (con-
cluding that under well-established applicable doctrines no cause of action lies for unin-
tended harm sustained by one, solely as result of injuries inflicted directly upon another,
regardless of relationship); Albala, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (finding damages are not recover-
able when wrong was committed against another); Robin C. Hewitt, Farley v. Sartin: Via-
bility of a Fetus No Longer Required for Wrongful Death Liability, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 955,
960-65 (1996) (reasoning behind denial of wrongful death damages for unborn is that
mother may recover for death of her unborn child through damages for her physical injury
and mental suffering associated with stillbirth; if she also recovered damages as adminis-
trator of her stillborn child, she would be receiving double recovery). See generally Alan J.
Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U.
BALT. L. REV. 185, 214 (1993) (stating that duty of care extends to unborn child). See, e.g.
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d at 401, 404 386 N.E.2d 807, 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 895, 898
(1978) (assuming physicians owed duty to infants in utero).
70 BLAcies, supra note 1, at 443 (defining derivative action as actions based on injury to
another).
71 See Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1158 (La. 1988) (noting it is well-
settled that duty may exist to foreseeable plaintiff, even if they were unknown and remote
in time and place); Id. (citing Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E. 1250, 1254-55 (Ill.
1977)) (recognizing limited area of transferred negligence). See generally Wintersteen v.
National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 197 N.E. 578, 582 (ll. 1935) (finding every person
owes duty to others to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury that have reasonably prob-
able and foreseeable consequence). See, e.g., Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892-93 (Ill.
1960) (recognizing cause of action on behalf of parent or spouse as derivative parties);
Miller v. Rivard, 180 A.D.2d 331, 334 585 N.Y.S.2d 523, 526 (3d Dep't 1992) (finding harm
to husband from negligent sterilization procedure gives rise to wife's cause of action).
72 See Reed v. Campagnalo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1148 (Md. 1993) (stating duty to mother
extends to unborn child); see also Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 409, 386 N.E.2d at 811 413 N.Y.S. 2d
at 899 (accepting duty to parents extends to infants in utero); Id. (citing Woods v. Lancet,
303 N.Y. 349, 353, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951) (N.Y. 1951) (holding viable fetus has sepa-
rate existence that is recognized in law)); Michael A. Berenson, The Wrongful Life Claim-
The Legal Dilemma of Existence Versus Nonexistence: "To Be or Not to Be", 64 TuL. L. REV.
895, 898 (1990) (asserting courts recognized viability of fetus before most legislatures did).
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tus.73 Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to extend the duty to
a fetus not yet viable at the time of injury. 74
Numerous policy considerations 75 support extension of duty to
an unborn child. Duty to an unborn child encourages thorough
analysis by health care providers.76 In all areas of medicine,77 a
health care provider is more likely to use reasonable care if he or
she may be subject to legal liability.78 The possibility that there
73 See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946) (holding, for first time,
that child, if born alive and viable can maintain action for injuries wrongfully inflicted
while in womb of mother); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (Ill. 1977)
(extending duty to infants not even considered viable at time of injury); Walker, 604 N.E.2d
at 594 (concluding physician treating pregnant mother owes duty to unborn child based on
contractual relationship between them; that child is foreseeable plaintiff, and; public policy
compels extension of duty); Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 404, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
898 (assuming physicians owed duty to infants in utero); Bopp, supra note 25, at 479-80
(noting that prenatal torts require fetus be born alive, otherwise making it impossible to
determine if child was viable in utero at time of injury).
74 See Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1253 (rejecting viability as criterion for recovery for prena-
tal injuries); see also Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983) (hold-
ing duty may extend to persons not yet conceived at time of negligent act); Bopp, supra note
25, at 480 (citing PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 70, at 369) (noting that due to recent
advances in embryology and medical technology, medical proof of causation has become
increasingly reliable, which supports eliminating viability or other arbitrary developmen-
tal requirements).
75 See, e.g., Ramey v. Fossoulas, 414 So. 2d 198, 200-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (noting
that cost of raising impaired child included in damages award); Mears v. Alhadeff, 88
A.D.2d 827, 827 451 N.Y.S.2d 133, 133-34 (1st Dep't 1982) (allowing damages for educa-
tion, but not for embarrassment to unwed mother); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hosp.,
453 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. 1982) (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (finding that benefit of raising child
does not outweigh physician's negligence) (quoting Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 111,
366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 395 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (1977)).
76 See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496 (noting recognition of duty provides comprehensive and
consistent deterrent to malpractice); see also Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962 (Cal.
1982) (recognizing extension of duty discourages malpractice); Hernandez, supra note 9, at
405 (arguing that approval of wrongful life claim deters medical malpractice); Michael B.
Kelly, The Rightful Position in 'Wrongful Life" Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 508 (1991)
(arguing that in genetic counseling wrongful claims, deterrence is consistent with purposes
of tort law).
77 But see Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 352 (Nev. 1995) (finding public policy
concern in deterring wrongful conduct is not so great as to overcome difficulty of determin-
ing damages in wrongful life action). See, e.g., Chizman v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 209
(Alaska 1995) (noting award of punitive damages is necessary to deter wrongdoer from
offensive act and may be imposed for lack of reasonable care in malpractice cases); Madrid
v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 923 P.2d 1154, 1162 (N.M. 1996) (finding, in light of deadly
nature of AIDS, courts should encourage reasonable care standard in handling of poten-
tially contaminated blood products and impose liability for failure to use reasonable care in
effort to deter unreasonable conduct); Matthew K. Richards, The Utah Medical No-Fault
Proposal: A Problem-Fraught Rejection of the Current Tort System, 1996 BYU L. REv. 103,
106-07 (1996) (advocating tort reform to better address deterrence and compensation in
tort actions).
78 See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496 (discussing policy reasons underlying recognition of
wrongful life action); see also Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of
Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 939, 992 (1984) (concluding that essential deterrent value of tort system is psychologi-
cal: "the declaration of wrongfulness and the social stigma"); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical
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may be redress for health care providers for the extraordinary ex-
penses related to pediatric AIDS79 deters negligent administra-
tion of HIV tests.8 0 This extension also supports societal objectives
to prevent harm detectable with medicine and technology.81 The
extensive availability of HIV tests is an important preventative
measure,8 2 so failure to administer an HIV test correctly under-
mines the test's preventative effect.8 3 Finally, extension of the
duty allows comprehensive compensation for those injured by
malpractice.8 4 HIV-positive infants require expensive care.8 5
Malpractice on Trial: Quality of Care is the Important Standard, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
321, 328-35 (1986) (discussing deterrent value of malpractice suits). But see also Mitchell S.
Berger, Following The Doctor's Orders - Caps on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Mal-
practice Cases, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 173, 184 (1990) (stating that there is no deterrent effect in
liability for medical malpractice because of liability insurance system and medical financial
care market structure).
79 See James Bopp, Jr. & Deborah Hall Gardner, Aids Babies, Crack Babies: Challenges
to the Law, 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 3, 3 (1991) (stating cost of hospital delivery, prenatal care,
and foster care for only 8,974 of HIV-positive infants through age of five would be $500
million, and additional cost of preparing children for school could exceed $1.5 billion). See
generally O'Brien, supra note 10, at 610 (discussing costs involved in caring for HIV posi-
tive infants); Joelle S. Weiss, Controlling HiV-Positive Women's Procreative Destiny: A Crit-
ical Equal Protection Analysis, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 643, 709 (1992) (discussing HIV
infants and cost of care).
80 See generally Hernandez, supra note 9, at 406 (discussing rationale of shifting costs of
any resulting harm to those who are in better position to prevent harm from occurring);
Terri Skladany, Physician Immunity Under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act: A Test
Without Direction, 10 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 5, 42 (1988) (stating that there is substantial
support for position that tort law can deter negligent medical liability).
81 See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496 (stating imposition of duty to child fosters societal
objectives of genetic counseling and prenatal testing, and discourages malpractice); see also
Siemienic v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 480 N.E. 1227, 1234 (l. App. Ct. 1985) (noting develop-
ment of techniques that mitigate or alleviate child's prenatal harm, requiring extension of
duty), affd in part, rev'd in part, 512 N.E.2d 691, 708 (Il1. 1987) (allowing recovery for
emotional distress).
82 See Michael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of HIV Blood Test Results to the Individ-
uals Tested: A Matter of Personal Choice Neglected, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 458 (1991).
Closen argues that HIV test results should not be mandatorily disclosed to tested persons.
Id. He notes that "members of the public are aware of H1V/AIDS and the routes of its
transmission" because of media attention focused upon the epidemic. Id. at 457. For exam-
ple, "[tihe Surgeon General's pamphlet . .. was mailed to almost every household in the
United States; reports... appeared widely in newspapers and magazines, and on television
and radio." Id. at 457-58; see also Preventing H1V/AIDS, supra note 2, at 39. A step toward
prevention of HIV in young people is comprehensive HIV education and services. Id. See,
e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.022(a)(3) (West 1990). This statute describes Wisconsin's public
education campaign about HIV and AIDS. Id.
83 See, e.g., Closen, supra note 82, at 457-58 (discussing media attention on AIDS epi-
demic and distribution of HIV/AIDS information); Preventing HIVIAIDS, supra note 2, at
39 (discussing role of various institutions, including media, schools and parents, in educat-
ing teens about prevention of AIDS); Condoms Are All the Rage, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REP., Oct. 17, 1988, at 44 (discussing controversial giveaway plans for comdoms in hopes of
preventing spread of AIDS).
84 See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496 (noting extension of duty permits payment of extraordi-
nary expenses); see also Hernandez, supra note 9, at 406 (arguing benefits of cost-shifting).
See generally Hutton Brown et al., Special Project Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding
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Since paying extraordinary medical costs is a difficult burden 6 for
families of infected infants,8 7 imposing liability on negligent
health care providers places the responsibility squarely upon
those most culpable. 8
Health care providers also have a duty to meet a standard of
reasonable care.89 In medical malpractice actions,9" New York
Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 752-54 (1986) (discussing ade-
quate compensation in wrongful life actions); James M. Parker, Jr., Wrongful Life: The
Child's Cause of Action for Negligent Genetic Counseling in Texas. 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639,
675 (1985) (discussing wrongful life, compensation and cost-shifting).
85 See Hegarty, supra note 1, at 1901 (estimating cost of caring for boarder babies); Her-
nandez, supra note 9, at 406 (discussing benefits of cost shifting); Sangree, supra note 14,
at 314 n.14 (estimating cost of caring for AIDS babies).
86 See, e.g., N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAw § 3614 (McKinney 1996) (mandating that no govern-
ment agency will pay for long term health care relating to AIDS unless commissioner au-
thorizes such care, after assessing various factors, including cost, geography, economic fac-
tors, and need for incentives); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 369-m (McKinney 1992) (providing
that social services will only pay part or all of insurance costs relating to AIDS treatment if
patient is unemployed; has no health care through employer, or pays health care benefits
independently; and patient resides in household with income less than 185% of poverty
line); N.Y. Comp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 86-4.41 (1996) (limiting reimbursement to
freestanding ambulatory units to single price per visit, one visit per day for treatment re-
lating to AIDS); Lee Ann Dean, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Viatical Settle-
ment, and the Health Care Crisis: AIDS Patients Reach into the Future to Make Ends Meet,
25 RUTGERS L.J. 117, 121 (1993) (discussing trend of viatical companies which buy insur-
ance policies from terminally ill patients at 50-80% of death benefit and AIDS patients use
money to cover treatment costs); Malcolm E. Osborn, Rapidly Developing Law on Viatical
Settlements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 471, 478 n.44 (1996) (discussing concern for mini-
mum payments related to AIDS treatment in light of advancing medical therapies that
extend life of AIDS patients).
87 See Hernandez, supra note 9, at 394 (discussing medical care and maintenance falling
on "overburdened social institutions"); McKenna, supra note 6, at 145 (discussing that state
has interest because of costs of providing medical care to infected infants and foster care to
children whose mothers can no longer care for them); Sangree, supra note 14, at 315 (stat-
ing that because majority of HIV-infected women are poor, HIV-positive babies present
tremendous economic burden to state).
88 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Association Life Ins. Co., 641 So. 2d 895, 896-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding insurance company did not conspicuously put in provision limiting ben-
efits attributable to AIDS treatment); Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 562
N.Y.S.2d 908, 910-11 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990) (directing insurance company to pay for
bone marrow transplant hospitalization costs for patient infected with HIV); Jackson
Township Volunteer Fire Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (WALLET), 594 A.2d
826, 828-29 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (holding Workmen's Compensation benefits must ex-
tend to insured persons exposed to serious risk of contracting contagious and infectious
diseases, including HIV); Katherine Benesch, AIDS and the ADA in the Health Care Work-
place, Brief, 23-SPG BRIEF 22, 24 (noting that HIV infections is protected by American with
Disabilities Act); Sharona Hoffman & Guy D. Kidd, AIDS: Insurance Coverage and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 32-AUG Hous. LAw. 27, 27 (1994) (discussing impact of
rising cost of AIDS treatment on private and employer-provided health insurance).
89 See PROSSER, supra note 27, at 131 (noting that actor must protect others from unrea-
sonable risks); see also Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 9-11 (N.J. 1979) (deciding in favor of
wrongful birth action where physician failed to exercise reasonable care by not informing
his patients, expectant mother and her husband, of need to undergo amniocentesis, diag-
nostic procedure to determine whether fetus was congenitally defective). See generally RE-
STATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) (finding risk to be unreasonable if "a reason-
able man would recognize [it] as involving a risk of harm to another"); R. Keith Johnson,
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courts examine use of reasonable care,9 requisite skill and knowl-
edge and one's best judgment.92 In wrongful life actions,93 the rea-
sonable care standard is problematic.94 Risks, accuracy of testing,
and predictability of potential dangers in pre-natal care are un-
clear.95 As medicine and technology progress at a rapid rate,96
Medical Malpractice And 'Wrongful Birth- A Critical Analysis Of Wilson v. Kuenzi, 57
UMKC L. REV. 337, 340 (1989) (discussing requirements that medical malpractice claim
establish that physician failed to live up to standard of reasonable care of his or her profes-
sion, that plaintiff was injured, and that failure to live up to standard of care was proxi-
mate cause of plaintiffs injury).
90 See Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 203, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898). The court noted
that:
law relating to malpractice is simple and well settled ... A physician ... impliedly
represents that he possesses .. .that reasonable degree of learning and skill that is
ordinarily possessed by physicians... in the locality where he practices, and which is
ordinarily regarded by those conversant with the employment as necessary to qualify
him to engage in the business of practicing medicine.
Id. Failure to exercise requisite knowledge and skill constitutes breach. Id. See generally
Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical Jurisprudence of
Medical Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1193, 1197 (1992). The author surveys the history
and elements of medical malpractice. Id.
91 See Pike, 155 N.Y. at 203, 49 N.E. at 762 (discussing malpractice action).
92 See id. (discussing reasonable care in malpractice actions).
93 See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) (discuss-
ing reasonable standard of care for disclosure of defects to mother who contracted German
measles during her first trimester); see also Khan v. HIP Hosp., Inc., 127 Misc.2d 1062,
1067, 487 N.Y.S.2d 700, 704 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985) (holding physicians did not
violate standard of care because duty did not extend to unborn infant). See generally John-
son, supra note 89, at 346 (discussing standards of care and wrongful life); Phillip J. Van
Derhoef, Washington Recognizes Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life-A Critical Analysis
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 58 WASH. L. REV. 649, 665 (1983) (stating standard of care
as element of wrongful life).
94 See, e.g., Reed v. Campagnalo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Md. 1993) (questioning
whether offering or performance of amniocentesis test was standard practice); Gleitman,
227 A.2d at 691 (discussing reasonable standard of care for disclosure of defects to mother
who contracted German measles during her first trimester); Khan, 127 Misc.2d at 1067,
487 N.Y.S.2d at 704 (holding physicians did not violate standard of care because duty did
not extend to unborn infant).
95 See, e.g., Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 819, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 1341 369
N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (1977) (concluding use of amniocentesis test was not standard practice in
1969); see also Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F. Supp. 746, 750 (D.D.C. 1993) (dis-
cussing applicable standards for disclosure of HIV test results in 1987 and 1988); Duffey v.
Fear, 121 A.D.2d 928, 931, 505 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139 (1st Dep't 1986) (finding that removal of
IUD was not standard practice in 1970).
96 See John R. Penhallegon, What's Happening in the Law: Surveying the New Develop-
ments, 60 DEF. CouNs. J. 365, 365 (1993) (noting "in the preconception tort arena, increases
in medical science have caused plaintiffs to press the cutting edge (some would say the
bleeding edge) of foreseeability"); see also HIV Infection, supra note 3, at 2416 (noting that
in 1990 many HIV-infected women had no access to medical care for management of HIV);
Obstetrics/Testing HIV Counseling and Voluntary Testing for All Pregnant Women Urged,
AIDS WKLY, July 31, 1995 [hereinafter Obstetrics/Testing] (discussing development of
guidelines showing women can reduce HIV transmission to babies by two-thirds if
zidovudine (AZT) therapy is performed at 14 weeks). See generally Kirk B. Johnson et al., A
Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1370 (1989) (stating that despite technological progress, appropriate
treatment for particular case is often debated within medical field).
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there is disagreement in the medical community concerning what
are standard tests and risks.97 These problems have led New York
courts to determine that physicians often have not violated a stan-
dard of care. 98
It is submitted that the standard of care in wrongful life actions
on behalf of HIV-infected infants is ascertainable. HIV testing is
widespread and the procedures for administration 99 are clear.100
When a health care provider tests a pregnant mother for HIV,
that mother may reasonably expect accurate communication of
those results.1 1 Inaccurate communication of test results, 10 2 or
97 See Johnson, 42 N.Y.2d at 819, 364 N.E.2d at 1341, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 648 (discussing
amniocentesis test); see also Estate of Doe, 824 F. Supp. at 750 (deciding disclosure of HIV
test results); Reed, 630 A.2d at 1148-49 (questioning standard of amniocentesis test); HIV
Infection, supra note 3, at 2416 (discussing difficulty in finding adequate medical care for
HIV-positive newborns).
98 See Khan, 127 Misc.2d at 1067 487 N.Y.S.2d at 704 (holding physician did not violate
standard of care); see also Bougher v. Choi, 562 N.E.2d 1289, 1290 (Ind. 1990) (determining
that evidence did not support conclusion that orthopedic surgeon breached standard of
care); Rodriguez v. Reeves, 730 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that plaintiff in
medical malpractice action failed to establish standard of care in community for purpose of
establishing that conduct of physician or hospital violated or breached that standard); Ja-
son Wolfe, Doctors Cleared in Boy's HIV Case the Lawsuit Raised the Sticky Question of
Whether it is Ever Better for a Child Never to Have Been Born, PORTLAND PREss HERALD,
Apr. 3, 1996, at 1A (discussing dismissal of case on grounds that physician met standard of
care).
99 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2781(1) (McKinney 1996) (providing health care provider
cannot order HIV test without written, informed consent of subject of test); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1996) (providing person may not disclose HIV-related in-
formation except in certain enumerated situations); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2783(1)(b)
(McKinney 1996) (stating maximum civil penalty for violation of either § 2781 or § 2782 is
$5000 for each occurrence); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2784 (McKinney 1996) (excluding in-
surance organizations from rules regulating confidentiality and testing for H1V); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAw § 2785(2)-(5) (McKinney 1996) (setting forth rules for obtaining court order for
disclosure of HIV information); see also 42 C.F.R. § 482 (1996) (requiring hospitals partici-
pating in Medicare and Medicaid programs, as of November 8, 1996, to take appropriate
action when receiving blood at increased risk of transmitting HIV, including notifying do-
nor or patient).
100 See Renna, supra note 10, at 412-15 (discussing various HIV tests available and their
accuracy, difficulty and expense). But see Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Profession-
als, and Aids: The 'Right To Know' the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD.
L. REV. 12, 39 (1989) (stating that it is mistakenly presumed that routine testing for HiV is
standard of care in medical profession, but Center for Disease Control recommends against
screening low risk groups). See generally Taunya L. Banks, Women and AIDS-Racism,
Sexism, and Classism, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 351, 354-60 (1990) (discussing
testing methodology for HIV).
101 See Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41 (discussing Sophie Newman's comment after
doctor failed to inform her of HIV-positive test result); see also N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2500-f (McKinney 1996) (requiring New York state to set up comprehensive program for
disclosure and administration of HIV tests); Diagnosis of HIV, supra note 32 (discussing
failure of doctor to inform Newman); Mom Not Told, supra note 16, at 8 (noting Newman's
plight).
102 See R.J. and P.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 625 So. 2d 116, 116 (Fla. 1993) (discuss-
ing case where patient diagnosed as HIV positive, when, in fact, he was not); Mother Sues,
supra note 22, at A41 (discussing physician's failure to tell Newman of her correct HIV test
220 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:205
failure to properly administer the test, then, are violations of the
standard of care. 10
3
The second element to a negligence-based claim, breach of
duty,' °4 is not normally a problematic element in wrongful life ac-
tions.' 0 5 In earlier HIV-related cases, however, plaintiffs met
some obstacles. 10 6 Previously, medicine and technology related to
HIV and AIDS were slow to standardize themselves.1 7 Today, the
results); see also Estate of Doe, 824 F. Supp. at 747 (discussing case of pregnant mother who
was never informed of receiving HIV-positive blood, and died, along with her child from
AIDS-related disease); Gostin, supra note 100, at 39 (stating that physician who fails to
adequately inform and counsel patient prior to performing HIV test is likely to be found
negligent for failing to conform with professional standard of care); Renna, supra note 10,
at 407 (imagining "tragedy of a mother who rushes her sick infant to the hospital ... and
learns that her child is infected with [HIV]"). See generally Constance H. Baker & Megan
M. Arthur, Aids in the Hospital Workplace: Theories of Hospital Liability, 24 TORT & INS.
L.J. 1, 2 (1988) (discussing misdiagnosis and failure to adequately counsel in HIV testing);
Roger N. Braden, Aids: Dealing with the Plague, 19 N. Ky. L. REV. 277, 293 (1992) (stating
that after development of testing for HIV in 1985, blood bank would be held liable in negli-
gence for failure to administer test, improperly administering test or misreading results).
103 See generally Young v. Colligan, M.D., 560 So. 2d 843, 845-46 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
(discussing necessity of calling expert witnesses qualified in medical profession to prove
whether defendant health care provider possessed requisite knowledge or skill, or failed to
exercise reasonable care); Martin B. Adams & Glenn W. Dopf, Trial Practice in Medical
Malpractice Case: A Defense Perspective (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
396, 1990) 109, 119-123 (1990) (discussing requirement of medical expert testimony in mal-
practice cases to establish defendant's departure from medically accepted standards of
care).
104 See PROSSER, supra note 27, at 131 (setting forth breach of duty element as essential
to negligence action); see also Young, 560 So. 2d at 845-46 (finding requirement of expert
testimony to establish whether defendant failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence);
Jennifer S.R. Lynn, Connecticut Medical Malpractice, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 381, 388-89
(1992) (explaining that plaintiff in medical malpractice case must present expert testimony
to establish applicable standard of care and deviation from that standard of care and to
prove causation and extent of plaintiffs injury).
105 But see Marsh v. Minneapolis Herald, Inc., 134 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. 1965) (discuss-
ing case where once duty proven, finding breach of that duty was difficult). See, e.g.,
Cramer v. Housing Opportunities Comm'n of Montgomery County, 501 A.2d 35, 39 (Md.
1984) (noting that breaches of duty owed to another is negligence); Blair v. Mt. Hood Mead-
ows Dev. Corp., 630 P.2d 827, 832 (Or. 1980) (discussing that establishing duty and breach
is necessary and important factor when proving negligence), modified, 634 P.2d 241 (Or.
1981); Russ Versteeg, Running Scared: Negligence and the Running Boom, 4 SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 447, 450 (1994) (noting that breach of duty occurs when defendant fails to act
like reasonable person under circumstances).
106 See R.J. and P.J., 625 So. 2d at 117 (denying recovery to patient told he was HIV-
positive when he was not because he suffered no physical injury); see also Estate of Doe, 824
F. Supp. at 749 (denying recovery against blood bank because statute of limitations had
run); Chambarry v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 161 Misc.2d 1000, 1002-03, 615 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994) (finding plaintiff could not recover against hospital who gave
her transfusion of HIV-positive blood because she had not yet developed AIDS); Wolfe,
supra note 98, at 1A (discussing denial of Anastosopoulos claim because HIV screening not
standard medical practice until after birth of her child).
107 See Estate of Doe, 824 F. Supp. at 749 (noting that questions to ask, screening proce-
dures, identification of inappropriate blood donors, and tests applied to blood samples rely
upon medical judgments); see also Chambarry, 161 Misc.2d at 1003, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 833
(discussing judge's concern about state of knowledge of HIV and AIDS in 1981); Hernandez,
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administration of HIV tests has specific guidelines.' 08 Policy con-
cerns also support accurate disclosure of HIV test results to the
patient.109 Failure to administer the test properly, 110 or failure to
inform a mother of the results,"1 constitutes a breach of the stan-
dard of care.
2. Finding a Causal Link Between Breach and Injury
Establishing causation" 2 requires a systematic analysis." 3
First, courts employ the "but for" test" 4 to establish whether the
supra note 9, at 405 (noting that as of 1994 physicians could not ensure child would not be
born with HV).
108 See Renna, supra note 10, at 412-15 (discussing various types of available HIV tests).
See generally Leonard C. Heath, Jr., A Hospital's Dilemma: The Legal Implications of
Promulgating Guidelines Concerning Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 23 U. RICH. L. REV.
39, 43-44 (1988) (explaining procedures for testing for HIV); Maia E. Scott, Tests For Pedi-
atric Aids: Are We Failing Our Children?, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 217, 232-34 (1995) (dis-
cussing HIV testing in newborns).
109 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2500-f (McKinney 1996) (addressing HIV testing of
newborns by ordering promulgation of regulations to deal with issue by June 26, 1996); see
also, 1996 N.Y. LAws 220 (adding, in Executive Memorandum of Governor, on June 26,
1996, § 2500-f to Public Health Law of New York); 1996 N.Y. LAws 220 (stating, in Memo-
randum, New York State Assembly's support of § 2500-f of Public Health Law); R.J. and
P.J., 625 So. 2d at 116 (discussing case where patient told he was HIV-positive when he
was not); Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41 (discussing case where mother not informed of
her HIV test results).
110 See, e.g., Byrd v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 637 So. 2d 114, 117 (La.
1994) (discussing case in which plaintiff alleges physician was negligent in failing to test
for viral cause of patient's colitis); Young v. Colligan, M.D., 560 So. 2d 843, 845 (La. Ct.
App. 1990) (discussing plaintiffs claim that physician was negligent in his failure to ad-
minister pregnancy test prior to performing hysterectomy); McNulty v. McDowell, 613
N.E.2d 904, 907 (Mass. 1993) (noting that when physician failed to administer tests or
procedures designed for benefit of later-conceived child, duty was breached).
111 See Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41 (discussing case where mother not informed
of her HIV test results). See generally Heath, supra note 108, at 43-44 (discussing guide-
lines for HIV testing).
112 See PROSSER, supra note 27, at 131 (defining causation as "reasonably close causal
connection between the conduct and the resulting injury"); see also United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1947) (setting out elements of negligence, including
causation); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928)
(finding that bodily security only protected against some forms of interference or aggres-
sion). See generally Beauchene v. Synanon Found., Inc., 88 Cal. App.3d 342, 345-47 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979) (recognizing components of causation); Reiman Assoc., Inc. v. R/A Advertis-
ing Inc., 306 N.W.2d 292, 294-95 (Wis. 1981) (stating that legal cause is comprised of two
components: cause in fact and proximate cause).
113 See Williams v. University of Chicago Hosp., 667 N.E.2d 738, 742 (111. App. Ct. 1996)
(defining proximate cause as injury that is natural and probable result of negligent act). Id.
(citing Quirke v. City of Harvey, 639 N.E.2d 1355, 1358 (ll. 1994) (discussing requirements
of proving proximate cause, intervening acts and superseding acts); see also Yonce v.
Smithkline Beecham Clinical Lab., Inc., 680 A.2d 569, 575-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)
(analyzing proximate cause under two tests).
114 See Yonce, 680 A.2d at 575 (defining "but for" test); see also Hensley v. U.S., 728 F.
Supp. 716, 721 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (stating that to establish proximate cause under Florida
law, plaintiffs must show that defendant's alleged wrong caused damage of which they
complain; "but for" test or causation in fact is essential element to proximate cause); Rober-
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causation was necessary to evince an injurious result. 115 If the in-
jury would have occurred absent the defendant's wrongful con-
duct,1" 6 the defendant is not liable.1 7 The HIV-positive status of
an infant would not occur"" without inaccurate administration of
an HIV test to the mother." 9 The "but for" test, however, is not
the end of the inquiry when more than one independent cause
brings about the harmful result. 20 Defendants often argue in
wrongful life actions that conception, or a mother's decision not to
abort the fetus,' 2 ' occurred after the alleged violation of the stan-
dard of care.' 22 When an infant is HIV-positive, the mother's con-
duct creates additional causes of that HIV-positive status. 23 With
two independent causes bringing about the child's subsequent im-
paired birth, courts must also ascertain whether the health care
provider's conduct was a proximate cause 24 of the injury. 25
son v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No.86-3359, 1988 WL 26478, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Mar.11,
1988) (defining causation in terms of"but for" sole cause test); BLAc's, supra note 1, at 200
(defining "but for" test as "[tiest used in determining tort liability by applying the causative
criterion as to whether the plaintiffwould not have suffered the wrong but for' the action of
the defendant").
115 See BLAcK's, supra note 1, at 221 (defining "cause in fact" as "particular cause which
produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred"). See generally
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1737-59 (1985) (discuss-
ing causation theories in negligence causes of action).
116 See Yonce, 680 A.2d at 575 (defining "but for" test).
117 See id. (defining "but for" test).
118 There is an assumption in the analysis that a mother with knowledge she is HIV-
positive will not conceive or give birth to an HIV-positive infant. This Note also assumes
that the HIV-infection does not come from some source other than the mother, such as a
blood transfusion to mother or child.
119 See Yonce, 680 A.2d at 575 (defining "but for" test); Roberson, 1988 WL 26478, at *4
(defining causation in terms of "but for" sole cause test); BLAcK's, supra note 1, at 200
(defining "but for" test).
120 See Roberson, 1988 WL 26478, at *4 (finding that "but for" test should not be used
when more than one independent cause brings about injury).
121 Any reference in analysis of conception as an intervening, superseding cause also
refers to a mother's decision not to abort.
122 See Hernandez, supra note 9, at 403 (discussing "fundamental stumbling block" in
determining difference in value between life with HIV and no life at all). See, e.g., Kush v.
Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423-24 (Fla. 1992) (denying recovery that requires weighing value of
impaired life against nonexistence); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 409-11 386 N.E.2d
807, 811-12 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899-900 (denying recovery for failure to prove injury).
123 See, e.g., Goldberg by Goldberg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530, 537 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(discussing mother's right to have all options, including abortion, available to her concern-
ing pregnancy); Jacqueline E. Mega, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Confusion
in New York and a Proposed Standard-Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical and Gynecological
Associates, P.C., 56 BROOK. L. REv. 379, 389-90 (1990) (discussing rejection in New York
courts of argument that failure to abort was superseding cause); Maxine A. Sonnenburg, A
Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 478-79 n.9 (1982) (discussing proposed California statute eliminating
tortfeasor's possible defense that failure to abort is intervening cause).
124 See Yonce, 680 A.2d at 575 (noting two subparts of proximate cause); see also Keel v.
Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Ala. 1993) (noting that plaintiff must prove causal connec-
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To determine proximate cause, 1 26 courts ascertain whether the
defendant's conduct substantially contributed to the birth of an
impaired child 127 by examining the chain of causation. 128 Concep-
tion 129 only breaks the chain of causation 30 if it is also a super-
tion between child's birth and defendant's negligence, showing that without that negli-
gence, plaintiff would have known of child's defects and would not have conceived or termi-
nated pregnancy); Blair v. Hutzel Hosp., 552 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(asserting in wrongful life claim that plaintiff can show that defendant's negligence de-
prived her of opportunity to learn of risks of bearing child with defects). See generally PRos-
SER, supra note 27, at 131 (noting causation is composed of two elements: causation in fact
and proximate causation).
125 See Keel, 624 So. 2d at 1026 (noting that plaintiff must prove causal connection be-
tween child's birth and defendant's negligence); Blair, 552 N.W.2d at 512 (asserting in
wrongful life that plaintiff can show that defendant's negligence deprived him or her of
opportunity to learn of risks of bearing child with defects).
126 See BLAcK's, supra note 1, at 1225 (defining proximate cause as "[t]hat which, in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces in-
jury, and without which the result would not have occurred"); Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R.,
Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928) (noting without element of proximate cause
courts would always find liability for any and all consequences); see also Williams v. State,
308 N.Y. 548, 553, 127 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1955) (finding that there is difficulty in applying
general rule to unique set of circumstances); O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423,
433, 171 N.E. 694, 697 (1930) (noting proximate cause is dependent upon facts of particular
case); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 170, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920) (noting question
of negligence should not be confused with causal connection between negligence and
injury).
127 See PROSSER, supra note 27, at 276 (discussing substantial factor test).
128 See Yonce, 680 A.2d at 576-77 (examining analysis of chain of causation).
129 See, e.g., Roseberry v. Brooks, 461 S.E.2d 262, 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding
mother's decision to undergo abortion as qualifying for unique medical treatment, was su-
perseding cause and actual cause of unborn child's death); Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d
591, 592 (Ind. 1992) (stating defendants argued conception was superseding cause); Lynch
v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical & Gynecological Assocs., P.C., 72 N.Y.2d, 632, 636-37, 532 N.E.2d
1239, 1241-42, 536 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13-14 (1988) (noting that plaintiff must show that any
action he or she took, or failed to take, to avoid danger created by defendant was normal
consequence of defendant's conduct); People v. Kane, 213 N.Y. 260, 268-69, 107 N.E. 655,
657 (1915) (discussing that in case where defendant shot victim, causing miscarriage, caus-
ing her death, miscarriage was not superseding cause, as shooting was traceable directly to
her death); Hoffman-Rattet v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 135 Misc.2d 750-756, 516 N.Y.S.2d 856,
861 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987) (holding physician's knowledge of harmful effects of IUD
device did not constitute intervening cause relieving manufacturer of liability); Van
Derhoef, supra note 93, at 666 (stating almost anything could be superseding cause);
Suzann M. Weber, Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later? The Question of Prospective Damage
Claims for Genetic Injury in Wrongful Life Cases, 23 IND. L. REV. 753, 788 (1990) (listing
various superseding causes).
130 See Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 596 (stating superseding, intervening cause must be fore-
seeable at time of injury to break causal link between wrongful conduct and injury); Id.
(citing Elder v. Fisher, 217 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ind. 1966) (discussing effect of superseding,
intervening cause on causal connection between conduct and injury)); see also Yonce, 680
A.2d at 576 (finding negligent or non-negligent intervening force may break chain of causa-
tion); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 348 (Okla. 1993) (finding superseding cause must
be independent of original act, adequate of itself to bring about result and not reasonably
foreseeable to actor). But see Lynch, 72 N.Y.2d at 636-37, 532 N.E.2d at 1241 536 N.Y.S.2d
at 13-14 (recognizing intervening act not foreseeable, or independent of or far removed
from defendant's conduct to be superseding act); Id. (citing Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting
Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314, 414 N.E.2d 666, 670, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169 (1980) (noting there
are situations where superseding act is not foreseeable)).
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seding cause. 13 1 For an intervening cause to supersede a defend-
ant's wrongful conduct, the cause must meet three criteria. 132
First, the intervening cause must be independent of the original
act.' 33 In wrongful life actions, the defendant is usually a health
care provider who treated the mother in relation to her preg-
nancy.13 4 It is submitted that the pregnancy, and thus the concep-
tion, are not independent of the physician's treatment of a preg-
nant mother, or any wrongful conduct on the defendant's part.
Next, the intervening cause must also be adequate in itself to
bring about the result. 35 While conception is adequate to bring
about birth,'3 6 it is not adequate to bring about impaired birth. 137
An impairment depends on numerous factors, including negligent
treatment, 38  inaccurate tests139 and genetic factors. 40  If a
mother relied upon the fact that she tested negative for HIV,' 4 1
both those inaccurate test results and the conception contributed
131 See BLAcK's, supra note 1, at 820 (defining intervening cause as "independent cause
which intervenes between the original wrongful act or omission and the injury"); see also
Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 314, 414 N.E.2d at 670 434 N.Y.S.2d at 169 (stating that acts of
third person intervening between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs injury do not neces-
sarily sever causal connection). But see Excelsior Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. State Liverpool &
London & Globe Ins. Co. of Liverpool, Eng., 296 N.Y. 40, 45, 69 N.E.2d 553, 555 (1946)
(finding that mental capacities of patient supersede duty mental institution owes to
community).
132 See Yonce, 680 A.2d at 577 (setting forth factors necessary to show that intervening
cause has risen "to the magnitude of a supervening cause").
133 See Graham, 847 P.2d at 348 (stating three criteria for superseding cause).
134 See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 480 N.E.2d 1227, 1228 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (suing defendant doctors who plaintiffs consulted as to whether prospective child
would be hemophiliac); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (La. 1988)
(suing physician who negligently performed tubal ligation); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 405-06 386 N.E.2d 807, 808-09, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896-97 (1978) (suing defendants
who treated mother prior to her pregnancy and failed to recommend amniocentesis test);
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1983) (suing doctors who pre-
scribed Dilantin to patient to treat epilepsy during her treatment for pregnancy).
135 See Graham, 847 P.2d at 348 (stating three criteria for superseding cause).
136 This Note assumes the mother does not terminate the pregnancy or miscarry prior to
birth.
137 It is submitted that conception is a factor in and of itself. This Note considers genetic
factors of the respective parents as factors unto themselves.
138 See, e.g., Pitre, 530 So. 2d at 1153 (negligently performing tubal ligation); Harbeson,
656 P.2d at 486 (negligently prescribing prescription drugs).
139 See, e.g., R.J. and P.J. v. Humana of Fla., 625 So. 2d 116, 116 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(negligently informing patient of HIV test result); Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41 (fail-
ing to inform mother of test results).
140 See, e.g., Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1146 (Md. 1993) (failing to inform of
existence of and need for prenatal testing to reveal genetic birth defects); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 405-06, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808-09, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896-97 (1978)
(failing to recommend amniocentesis test to mother over 35 years of age).
141 See Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41 (noting mother assumed physician would tell
her of her test results and subsequently conceived).
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to the birth of an HIV-positive infant. New York courts will not
impute an affirmative duty upon a mother to abort a fetus that
may be born with an impairment. 142 A woman has a legal right to
choose whether to abort 143 and failure to do so does not supersede
the physician's negligent conduct. 1'
The last factor is whether the original actor reasonably could
have foreseen the intervening occurrence.' 45 In a wrongful life ac-
tion, a health care provider may argue that he or she was unaware
that a mother was planning to conceive.' 46 The argument is coun-
tered with a contention that he or she should have known that his
or her patient may become pregnant, 147 especially if the defendant
was the patient's gynecologist or primary physician. In any event,
whether an intervening cause supersedes the defendant's wrong-
ful act is a question of fact for the jury.'14 As a result, it seems
that an HIV-positive infant seeking recovery for wrongful life may
be able to prove causation.
142 See Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical & Gynecological Assoc., P.C., 72 N.Y.2d 632, 637,
532 N.E.2d 1239, 1242, 536 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12-13 (1988) (finding plaintiffs choice to have
abortion not superseding cause, as matter of law). See, e.g., Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d
591, 596 (Ind. 1992) (finding that conceiving child is not superseding, intervening cause, so
court could not decide whether mother should have aborted). But see Roseberry v. Brooks,
461 S.E.2d 262, 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that mother's decision to have abortion
allowing her to undergo surgery that would save her own life was superseding, intervening
cause in death of unborn child).
143 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding Ninth Amendment encompasses
woman's decision whether or not to terminate pregnancy).
144 See, e.g., Blair v. Hurtzel Hosp., 552 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Mi. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
doctor has duty to ensure woman has information to decide her procreative options, includ-
ing abortion); Lynch, 72 N.Y.2d at 634-35, 532 N.E.2d at 1239-41, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13
(finding choice not to abort fetus is not superseding cause); Karen A. Bussel, Adventures in
Babysitting: Gestational Surrogate Mother Tort Liability, 41 DuKE L.J. 661, 683 (1991) (dis-
cussing fetal rights and women's rights and noting judiciary should not order procedures to
protect fetus while violating woman's autonomy).
145 See Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 348 (Okla. 1993) (stating three criteria for
superseding cause); see also Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 596 (noting that for intervening act to
break causal chain it must not be one that is foreseeable).
146 See McNulty v. McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904, 907 (Mass. 1993) (noting physician's
knowledge that mother intended to conceive was critical factor in determination of duty to
child, but refusing to hold physician liable for possibility that any woman of child-bearing
age may conceive).
147 See Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 596 (finding it was foreseeable that defendant's patient
would become pregnant again). But see McNulty, 613 N.E.2d at 907 (rejecting notion that
physician owes duty to later-conceived child based solely on fact that woman was capable of
becoming pregnant).
148 See Graham, 847 P.2d at 352 (noting superseding-cause elements are interwoven
with mother's conduct and should be determined by fact-finder); see also O'Neill v. City of
Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423,431, 171 N.E. 694, 697 (1930) (noting "legal or proximate cause is
always dependent upon the facts of a particular case").
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3. Solving the Mystery: A Legally Cognizable Injury
The final, and most problematic, element of a negligence action
is damages. 149 In a wrongful life action, New York courts consist-
ently deny recovery on the grounds that the impaired child did not
suffer an injury. 150 There are two strands to this argument. 151
First, New York courts do not want to make a determination that
an impaired life is worse than nonexistence. 52 Even if courts
could make such a determination, calculation of damages remains
speculative. 53 Second, negligence law seeks to place an injured
party in the position he or she would have occupied but for the
defendant's negligence.15 4 New York courts deem it impossible to
calculate damages when the alternative is nonexistence. 155
149 See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
900 (1978) (arguing wrongful life infant does not suffer legally cognizable injury); see also
PROSSER, supra note 27, at 131 (setting forth "actual loss or damage resulting to the inter-
ests of another" as last element of negligence); Kelly, supra note 76, at 514 (noting "[c]ourts
balk" at claim that impaired birth is loss for which an infant deserves compensation).
150 See Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 63 N.Y.2d 978, 979, 473 N.E.2d 244,
245-46 483 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (1984) (denying recovery for wrongful life claim because it
"'demands a calculation of damages dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson's
choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence,' which the law is not equipped to
make") (quoting Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (denying
wrongful life on grounds that there was no injury to plaintiff)); see also Hernandez, supra
note 9, at 403 (discussing "fundamental stumbling block" in determining difference in value
between life with HIV and no life at all). See, e.g., Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423-24
(Fla. 1992) (denying recovery that requires weighing value of impaired life against nonexis-
tence); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(following majority rule that "benefits' of parenthood far outweigh any of the mere mone-
tary burdens"); Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 811-12, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (deny-
ing recovery for failure to prove injury).
151 See Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411-12, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (discussing
two flaws to wrongful life action).
152 See Alquijay, 63 N.Y.2d at 979, 473 N.E.2d at 245-46, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 995-96 (deny-
ing recovery for wrongful life claim because calculation of damages depends upon compari-
son between choice of life in impaired state and nonexistence); Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812
(denying wrongful life claim on grounds that there in no injury to plaintiff); Weber, supra
note 129, at 758 (discussing how courts weigh defected life over nonexistence).
153 See Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (noting there is
"theoretical hurtle" in ascertaining damages).
154 See PROSSER, supra note 27, at 508 (noting courts award compensatory damages as
'closest possible financial equivalent" of injury); see also New York Transit Auth. v. State
Div. of Hum. Rts., 78 N.Y.2d 207, 214-15, 577 N.E.2d 40, 44, 573 N.Y.S.2d 49, 53 (1991)(ex-
plaining goal of tort law is to make victim whole); Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 56 N.Y.2d
332, 334 437 N.E.2d 1104, 1105, 452 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (1982) (declaring primary purpose
of compensatory damages is to make victim whole again); Becker, 46 N.Y.2d 411-12 386
N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (discussing that remedy in negligence is designed to
place that party in position he would have occupied but for negligence of defendant).
155 See Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (finding that
damages are too speculative to ascertain in wrongful life context); see also, Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) (finding that it was for courts
to measure impaired infant's damages); Alquijay, 63 N.Y.2d at 979, 473 N.E.2d at 245-46,
483 N.Y.S.2d at 995-96 (determining calculation of damages in wrongful life is impossible).
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Neither of these two contentions are unresolvable and public pol-
icy concerns 15 6 compel a resolution.
In declaring that an impaired life is not worse than nonexis-
tence, 157 all courts instinctively preserve the value of human life
above all else. 158 While successfully evading comparisons between
impaired life and nonexistence in wrongful life actions,'5 9 other
jurisdictions, nonetheless, have supported choices for death over
lives full of suffering, in right-to-die cases.16 0 Even when a patient
is incapable of choosing termination of life-sustaining treat-
ment,161 these courts permit withdrawal of the treatment. 62 Al-
156 But see Bopp, supra note 25, at 496-502 (discussing concerns of imposing liability on
physicians, including intrusion with medical and professional judgment, possibility that
physicians be required to administer every available test during prenatal care and viola-
tion of objections based on conscience). See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 76, at 508 (noting deter-
rence is reason for awarding damages in genetic counseling wrongful life actions).
157 See Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 693. The Gleitman court found that human intuition leads
to the conclusion that an infant would choose life with defects over no life at all. Id. This
conclusion is based on the fact that society instinctively values human life, with or without
handicaps, above all else. Id.
158 See id. Humanity seeks life and holds on to it, despite its heavy burdens. Id. The
right to life is inalienable and courts cannot say what defects should prevent an embryo
from living, precluding the claim that denial of the opportunity to terminate the existence
of a defective embryo was an injury. Id.; see also Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla.
1992). The problem is an "existential conundrum," baffling the wisest people in history,
including Shakespeare's Hamlet. Id.
159 See Kush, 616 So. 2d at 423 (denying any attempt to make fact-finder weigh value of
impaired life against nonexistence); see also Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411-12, 386 N.E.2d at
812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (deferring question of measurement of infant's damages to
legislature).
160 But see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990)
(finding, in plurality opinion, that state cannot substitute judgment of parents for that of
comatose patient in deciding whether to terminate life-sustaining treatment). See, e.g.,
Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing courts to
use substituted judgment in addressing whether there was clear and convincing evidence
that comatose patient will not recover in determining whether to terminate life-sustaining
treatment); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (N.J. 1976) (allowing withdrawal of life-
sustaining equipment from patient in persistent vegetative state, as long as medical com-
mittee agreed there was no possibility for patient to recover).
161 See generally Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REV. 375,
375-79 (1988) (discussing legal standards in right to die cases and analyzing several cases).
See, e.g., Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d at 367 (discussing patient's "chronic permanent
vegetative coma, absent brain function" condition); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 718 (Ga.
1984) (allowing termination of life-sustaining treatment for infant who lacked 85-90% of
her brain tissue and had no hope for recovery); In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1173 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (discussing case where parents sought 'do not resuscitate' order for infant exper-
iencing interventricular hemorrhaging); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651 (describing patient's con-
dition as "debilitated and allegedly moribund").
162 See Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d at 372 (allowing termination of life-sustaining
treatment); see also In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d at 723 (allowing family member to make deci-
sion to terminate life-sustaining treatment of adult in vegetative state); In re C.A., 603
N.E.2d at 1184 (allowing withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment based on family mem-
ber's consent); Care and Protection of Beth, 587 N.E.2d 1377, 1383 (Mass. 1992) (allowing
parents to put 'do not resuscitate order' on infant's charts when infant was in persistent
vegetative state); Kelly, supra note 76, at 537-38 (noting even when patient does not ex-
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lowing for the termination of life,' 6 3 even when a patient cannot
competently choose that termination,'6 4 while denying wrongful
life actions, is inconsistent.
New York courts also hold that calculation of damages is too
speculative in wrongful life actions. 165 The underlying principle is
that negligence seeks to place a wronged plaintiff in the position
he or she would have occupied but for the defendant's negli-
gence. 166 For an impaired infant, he or she would not have been
pressly desire to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, health care providers may withdraw
such treatment).
163 See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961-62 (Cal. 1982) (rejecting state policy that "as
a matter of law-that under all circumstances 'impaired life' is 'preferable' to 'nonlife'");
Smith v. Cote, 513 A-2d 341, 352-53 (N.H. 1986) (arguing issue in wrongful life was not
child's right to choose non-life over impaired life, but whether doctor caused an injury);
Kelly, supra note 76, at 539 (noting judicial recognition of inconsistency between recogniz-
ing right-to-die claims, but rejecting child's claim in genetic counseling torts).
164 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 719-20 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.
Ct. 36, 36-37 (Oct. 1, 1996). The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the constitu-
tionality of New York's right-to-die statute. Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997); see
also N.Y. PEN. LAw §§ 120.30, 125.15(3) (McKinney 1995). These statutes collectively
charge a physician assisting with suicide with manslaughter. §§ 125.15(3) & 120.32; Id. In
1994, three defendants, two dying of AIDS, filed suit against their physicians seeking medi-
cal assistance in hastening their death and for an injunction enjoining enforcement of the
Penal Law against these physicians. Quill, 80 F.3d at 719-20. The District Court denied the
injunction and dismissed the case. Id. at 720. The Second Circuit held there was no funda-
mental right to assisted suicide, but the laws prohibiting assisted suicide violated the Con-
stitution. Id. at 725, 731; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1. The statutes violated the
Equal Protection Clause, which provides no State shall "deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws". Id.; Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 36-37. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in this case on October 1, 1996. Id.
Daniel Wise, High Court Hears Assisted Suicide Case, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9, 1997, at 1. Oral
arguments were held before the Supreme Court on January 8, 1997, with Attorney General
Dennis C. Vacco defending a ban on physician-assisted suicide. Id. Vacco tried to draw a
distinction between administration of life-ending drugs and withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment. Id. at 1. Professor Laurence Tribe, arguing in favor of physician assisted sui-
cide, said there was little distinction, as many patients already refuse life-extending proce-
dures. Id. at 1.
Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2296. As expected, on June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that
terminally-ill patients have no constitutional right to medically-assisted suicide. Id.; Wil-
liam Goldschlag, Suicide's Not a Right, Say Justices, DAILY NEWS, June 26, 1997, at 2.
However, Rehnquist indicated that discussions on the debate should continue. Id.; Sheryl
Galy Stolberg, The Good Death: Embracing a Right to Die Well, N.Y. TrmEs, June 29, 1997,
at El. A still unsettled issue is the fact that modern medicine has made the dying process
worse. Id. It is submitted that the Court's determination only highlights the fact that a
short life of suffering, with a prolonged, painful death, is an injury.
165 See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
899 (1978) (discussing "theoretical hurdle" in ascertaining damages); see also Kush v.
Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla. 1992) (denying wrongful life recovery because calculation of
damages was impossible); Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 473 N.E.2d 244 63
N.Y.2d 978, 979, 473 N.E.2d 244, 245, 483 N.Y.S.2d 994, 995 (1984) (finding calculation of
damages in wrongful life to be impossible).
166 See Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 410, 386 N.E.2d at 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (discussing
remedy afforded to plaintiff in negligence).
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born but for the defendant's negligence. 167 While calculation of in-
jury to an impaired infant is difficult, 161 it is certainly not impossi-
ble. New York courts may deduce certain aspects of the recov-
ery, 169 such as food, clothing and medical care. 1 70 Courts need not
address some pecuniary losses, such as loss of income, since a per-
son never born would never hold a job. 17 ' Further, a wrongful life
plaintiff cannot claim that he or she enjoyed a benefit having been
born.1 72 Thus, calculation of an offset for such a benefit is unneces-
sary.1 73 Finally, juries award pain and suffering to plaintiffs in
various other tort actions.' 74 While certainly a subjective determi-
167 See id. (explaining negligence principles).
165 See Kelly, supra note 76, at 515 (discussing that traditional damages rules afford
plaintiffs ways of demonstrating loss).
169 See id. at 516. These aspects of damages are pecuniary losses. Id.
170 See id. Any child requires
food, clothing, shelter, medical care and other necessities of lifeI"] easily ascertained.
Further, to truly determine the 'quality' of life in question, consideration should also be
given to the life span, available treatment, the potential for medical advances within
the child's lifetime, the socio-economic status of the parents and their ability to cope
with the handicap and afford treatment, and the societal attitude toward the
disability.
Id.
171 See id. (noting that if plaintiff never was born, he or she never would hold job, pre-
cluding need to calculate lost income).
172 See id. at 519. "[B]enefits rule" offsets the benefits the defendant confers upon the
plaintiff against recoverable damages. Id. This author rejects the benefits rule in genetic
counseling wrongful life cases for four reasons. Id. First, it thrusts unwanted benefits upon
a plaintiff, who never wanted to be born to begin with. Id. While the child lacks the capacity
to make such a determination, the defendant should not determine this either. Id. at 519-
520. Second, speculation as to benefits should not obscure certainty of the loss. Id. at 520.
Third, the benefits rule will not produce a total offset, it just may limit pain and suffering
recovery. Id. at 521. Finally, the benefits rule should not be used to deny support to chil-
dren. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §920, cmt. f (1979). This section pro-
vides an explanation of the benefits rule. Id.
173 See Kelly, supra note 76, at 521 (noting that benefits rule is ineffective). See generally
Joel Feinberg, Comment, Wrongful Conception and the Right Not to be Harmed, 8 HARV.
J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 57, 58-59 (1985) (discussing normal calculation of harm and benefits in
wrongful life). See, e.g., Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883, 886 (Conn. 1982) (finding benefits
test is no more speculative in wrongful birth cases than in wrongful death or loss of consor-
tium cases).
174 See Kelly, supra note 76, at 518 The author discusses pain and suffering awards in
various tort actions; Id. see also Chung v. New York Transit Auth., 213 A.D.2d 619, 619,
624 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225 (2d Dep't 1995). The Supreme Court awarded $1,300,000 for pain
and suffering in a personal injury action where plaintiff fell from a subway platform and
was hit by a train. Id. But see Snover v. McGraw, 667 N.E.2d 1310, 1317 (111. 1996). The
court found evidence of pain and suffering insufficient to support a pain and suffering
award in a personal injury, motor vehicle, action. Id. See, e.g., Thalman v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 676 A.2d 611, 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). The court modified the
pain and suffering award to $285,000 in a products liability action. Id.; See generally Pay-
ton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178-81 (Mass. 1982) This case discusses emotional
distress cases where injury is not provable and is thus subjective. Id.
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nation,'75 inclusion of pain and suffering in other negligence
awards 176 necessitates its inclusion in a wrongful life award.
177
Further, difficult assessment of injury in wrongful life actions
should not outweigh the various public policy reasons supporting
these claims.17 8 As previously discussed, 79 deterrence is an im-
portant policy concern.'8 0 Negligence principles also require shift-
ing the cost of an accident to the party responsible for that acci-
dent.18 ' Finally, tort law seeks to compensate victims of negligent
conduct,8 2 while spreading the cost 8 3 to those at fault. 184
175 See Kelly, supra note 76, at 518. (discussing speculative nature of pain and suffering
awards); see also Bopp, supra note 25, at 506-07 (noting that determination of quality of life
rests on consideration of life span, available treatment, potential for medical advances
within child's lifetime, socio-economic status of parents and their ability to cope with hand-
icap and treatment, and societal attitudes toward disability); Renna, supra note 10, at 438
(finding causes of pain and suffering for HIV-positive person include confrontation of"pain-
ful and ultimately fatal disease" and fear of unauthorized disclosure, both causing stress
that accelerates disease). But see Weissman v. Wells, 267 S.W. 400, 406 (Mo. 1924) (noting
that mere emotional distress without accompanying physical injury precludes recovery).
176 See generally Kelly, supra note 76, at 518 (discussing wrongful life awards).
177 See, e.g., Ramey v. Fossoulas, 414 So. 2d 198, 200-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (not-
ing that raising impaired child was used in calculation of damages award); Mears v. Al-
hadeff, 88 A.D.2d 827, 827, 451 N.Y.S.2d 133, 133-34 (1st Dep't. 1982) (allowing damages
for education, but not for embarrassment to unwed mother); Mason v. Western Penn-
sylvania Hosp., 453 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. 1982) (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (finding that law of
negligence should not turn on "fortuitous considerations" and benefit of raising child does
not outweigh physician's negligence) (quoting Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 112, 366
N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (1977)).
178 See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983) (noting that rec-
ognition of duty acts as comprehensive and consistent deterrent to malpractice); see also
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982) (recognizing extension of duty discourages
malpractice); Hernandez, supra note 9, at 405 (arguing approval of wrongful life claim de-
ters medical malpractice); Kelly, supra note 76, at 508 (arguing in genetic counseling
wrongful birth claims, deterrence is reason for tort law advances).
179 See Kelly, supra note 76, at 510 (noting deterrence entails imposition of full societal
cost of careless mistakes on those who make them).
180 See id. at 510 (finding that legal principles support placing cost of accident on one
who creates excessive risks, rather than innocent victim); see also Hernandez, supra note 9,
at 406 (arguing wrongful life action appropriately shifts costs to defendant).
181 See Kelly, supra note 76, at 511 (noting tort law seeks to compensate victims); see
also Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961 (noting plaintiffs compensatory remedy intends to restore
injured person as nearly as possible to position he or she would have been in had the wrong
not been done); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966)
(discussing that determination of compensatory damages wass necessary).
182 See William C. Way, The Problem of Economic Damages: Reconceptualizing the Moor-
man Doctrine, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1197 (1991) (proposing new approach to spreading
risks for economic damages in tort actions). But see Nicole A. Cunitz, Mandatory Malprac-
tice Insurance for Lawyers: Is There a Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion?,
8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 661 (1995) (discussing tort reform in effort to reduce malprac-
tice insurance costs in legal field); Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins: ERISA, HMO
Malpractice, and Enterprise Liability, 22 AMER. J.L. & MED. 7, 48 (noting problem with
spreading risk in health care delivery is feeling of undue burden on physicians).
183 See Kelly, supra note 76, at 511 (discussing cost of defendant's negligence may be
spread among purchasers of malpractice insurance and those purchasers' patients); see also
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An infant who is HIV-positive due to inaccurate administration
or disclosure of an HIV-test 8 5 does suffer an injury, as an im-
paired infant. As in right-to-die cases," 6 the infant's nonexistence
is better than a life of prolonged suffering from HIV or AIDS-re-
lated diseases.'8 7 Calculation of damages is also possible, relying
on vast evidence of the costs of raising a child infected with
HIV. "I Finally, policy concerns support recovery for the HIV-posi-
tive infant.' 89 As in any malpractice action, negligence principles
support shifting the cost of the child's impairment to the physician
who negligently administered the HIV test' 90 and deterring' 91
Hernandez, supra note 9, at 406 (arguing recovery in wrongful life makes funds available
to infant "in his own right," reducing risk that child will become dependent upon society).
184 See, e.g., R.J. and P.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 625 So. 2d 116, 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (discussing case where healthcare provider falsely told patient that he was HIV-
positive); Mother Sues, supra note 22, at A41 (discussing Newman case where mother not
informed of test results).
185 See Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REV. 375, 375-79
(1988) (discussing legal standards in right to die cases and analyzing several cases). See,
e.g., Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing courts
to use substituted judgment in addressing whether there is clear and convincing evidence
that comatose patient will not recover in determining whether to terminate life-sustaining
treatment); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 718 (Ga. 1984) (allowing termination of life-sus-
taining treatment for infant who lacked 85-90% of her brain tissue and had no hope for
recovery); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (N.J. 1976) (allowing withdrawal of life-
sustaining equipment from patient in persistent vegetative state).
186 See Scarlatti, supra note 3, at 863. The author notes that children infected with HIV
suffer symptoms in a rapid downhill course. Id. The symptoms include severe immu-
nodeficiency, hepatosplenomegaly, persistent fever, parotitis, gastroenteritis, lymphade-
nopathy, diarrhea and AIDS-defining secondary infections. Id. Young infants commonly
develop pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP). Id.; see also Fighting Fatigue Requires Bat-
tle on Many Fronts: Be Aggressive in Seeking Treatment, Experts Say, AIDS ALERT, Oct.,
1996, at S 1(2). This article notes that fatigue is a common symptom of AIDS. Id. It often
goes untreated, however, and leads to other symptoms, including depression. Id.
187 See Renna, supra note 10, at 437 (estimating cost of treating HIV-positive person at
$10,000 per year; for treating person with AIDs at $38,800 per year, and, for treating per-
son with AIDS at $102,000 for lifetime); see also Medical Care Costs, supra note 1, at 1901
(estimating average lifetime medical care costs of nine children dying from AIDS and
treated average of 129 days at Harlem Hospital Center was $90,347).
188 See, e.g., R.J. and P.J., 625 So. 2d at 116 (informing patient incorrectly that he was
HIV-positive).
189 See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982) (noting plaintiffs compensatory
remedy intends to restore injured person as nearly as possible to position he or she would
have been in had wrong not been done); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496
(Wash. 1983) (noting recognition of duty acts as comprehensive and consistent deterrent to
malpractice); Kelly, supra note 76, at 510 (finding that legal principles support placing cost
of accident on one who creates excessive risks, rather than innocent victim).
190 See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496 (recognizing duty provides deterrent to malpractice);
see also Hernandez, supra note 9, at 405 (arguing approval of wrongful life claim deters
medical malpractice); Kelly, supra note 76, at 508 (arguing in genetic counseling wrongful
claims, deterrence is reason for tort law advances).
191 See PaOSSER, supra note 27, at 594 (noting courts do not favor assumption of risk
because of potential for defense to reduce otherwise valid recovery); Kelly, supra note 76, at
511 (discussing assumption of risk on behalf of plaintiff in submitting to genetic testing).
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negligent conduct. While plaintiffs may accept the risk that the
test could be wrong, they do not assume the risk that a defendant
will make a mistake. 192 Thus, the negligent physician should pay
the cost of the child's extraordinary care. 193 Without such rem-
edy, 94 a child would be forced to shift this burden to the commu-
nity 95 or his or her family. 196 Thus, it is argued that an HIV-posi-
tive infant can prove damages in a wrongful life action.
II. LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT: A VIABLE REMEDY
Another type of tort action arises when a doctor fails to recom-
mend that a patient take an HIV test, given the doctor's knowl-
edge of the patient's history. For example, 197 two Maine doctors 1 98
knew their pregnant patient, Barbara Anastosopoulos, 99 was a
former prostitute and intravenous drug user,20 0 but never advised
192 See Renna, supra note 10, at 437 (estimating cost of care of HIV and AIDS patients);
see also Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 424 (Fla. 1992) (allowing recovery for extraordinary
expenses of infant's genetic impairment); Medical Care Costs, supra note 1, at 1901 (esti-
mating cost of care of HIV-positive infants).
193 See generally Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial
Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Costs Containment Injuries, 17 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 72 (1993) (noting one goal of current tort system is to spread cost of
injuries); Note, Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations-VI. Special Treatment
and Tort Law, 105 HIv. L. REv. 1677, 1690-91 (1992) (discussing problems with spreading
loss in tort actions).
194 See Bopp, supra note 25, at 506-07 (discussing evaluation of socio-economic status of
child's parents); Kelly, supra note 76, at 511 (discussing spreading costs of negligence
among members of medical community); see also HIV Infection, supra note 3, at 2416 (not-
ing HIV's disproportionate effect on disadvantaged women and children of color).
195 See Hernandez, supra note 9, at 406 (discussing that HIV-positive infants become
burden upon social institutions).
196 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1996) (providing lack of informed
consent is failure of person providing professional treatment to disclose to patient alterna-
tives, reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating informed consent doctrine was based on premise that
everyone has right to determine what can be done to his or her body); ZeBarth v. Swedish
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 499 P.2d 1, 8-9 (Wash. 1972) (defining informed consent as patient's bal-
ancing of risks of treatment against benefits of treatment); BLAcK's, supra note 1, at 779
(defining informed consent as "person's agreement to allow something to happen (such as
surgery) that is based on a full disclosure of facts needed to make the decision
intelligently").
197 See Claim by Boy, supra note 22, at Al (explaining that former prostitute and intra-
venous drug user filed claim against her physicians in 1991 alleging that their failure to
test her for HIV resulted in her son's HIV-positive status).
198 See id. Dr. Perakis was her primary doctor from 1982 to 1987 and Dr. Pollard her
obstetrician. Id.
199 See David Sharp, Former Prostitute with AIDS Sues Over Son's Birth-Woman Blames
Doctors for Not Urging HIV Tests, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 25, 1993, at Al. Ms. Anas-
tosopoulos was formerly a prostitute and intravenous drug user, but stopped prostituting
and using drugs, married and became pregnant. Id.
200 See id. (discussing facts of Anastosopoulos case).
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her to take an HIV test.20 1 Ms. Anastosopoulos subsequently gave
birth to an HIV-positive infant.20 2 Her claim, brought under
Maine's wrongful life statute,20 3 alleged her physicians denied her
the information necessary to decide whether to carry her baby to
term.20 4 The Superior Court of York County granted summary
judgment to the defendants,20 5 holding they did not violate any
standards of care.20 6 Had this case been in New York, Ms. Anas-
tosopoulos could seek a remedy under lack of informed consent.20 7
In New York, lack of informed consent is a negligence action. 20 8
This requires a showing that a health care provider did not fully
201 See John Ripley, Maine Lawsuit Raises Social, Legal, Medical Issues, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, May 17, 1994, at A4. Ms. Anastosopoulos actually sought treatment from Dr. Per-
akis for venereal diseases as early as 1981. Id.
202 See Ripley, supra note 201, at A4. Christopher Anastosopoulos was born in 1988,
developed AIDS, and his health declined rapidly. Id.
203 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 1990). The statute allows recovery "for the
birth of an unhealthy child born as a result of professional negligence... [and damages]
shall be limited to damages associated with the disease, defect, or handicap suffered by the
child." Id. at § 2931(3); see also Ripley, supra note 201, at A4. The Maine statute was en-
acted to answer claims about children conceived after failed sterilization. Id.
204 See Anastosopoulos v. Perakis, 644 A.2d 480, 481 (Me. 1994). Ms. Anastosopoulos
also sued for wrongful birth, on her own behalf, and for infliction of emotional distress. Id.
205 See id., 644 A.2d at 481. The Superior Court first reported the case to the Supreme
Judicial Court in 1994 on the grounds that it "involved 'questions of sufficient importance
and doubt'," particularly as to the interpretation of the wrongful life statute. Id. The Supe-
rior Court denied ruling on the case because there was no option available to dispose of the
action, as required by Rule 72 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 482; see also ME.
R. OF CrV. PRoc., Rule 72 (West 1996). This statute regulates appeals to the Superior Court
of Maine. Id.; Wolfe, supra note 98, at 1A. Ms. Anastosopoulos died of complications in
1995. Id. The court dismissed her wrongful birth claim in February of 1996 on the grounds
that the statute of limitations had run before commencement in 1991. Id.
206 See Wolfe, supra note 98, at A. In 1988, the HIV test was not reliable until four to
six months after birth. Id. Failure to test Christopher between his fourth month and his
tenth month, when he was diagnosed, made no difference in his health. Id.
207 See Renna, supra note 10, at 421 (noting patient must give informed consent prior to
medical procedures under law of every state, requiring physician to disclose all pertinent
information); see also N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1996) (setting forth
tort action of lack of informed consent); Yonce v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Lab., Inc.,
680 A.2d 569, 583 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (providing that lack of informed consent im-
poses duty on physician to disclose material risks and available alternatives); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 490 (Wash. 1983) (characterizing informed consent as im-
posing duty on physician to disclose risks associated with treatment to patient).
208 See Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp., 92 A.D.2d 131, 137-38, 459 N.Y.S.2d 814, 818-19
(2d Dep't 1983) (compelling medical practitioner to disclose available alternatives, risks
and benefits prior to treatment); see also N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2783(4) (McKinney 1996)
(stating that cause of action based on failure to provide information, explanations, or coun-
seling prior to obtaining written informed consent, or based on lack of informed consent in
ordering or performance of HIV related test are governed by section 2805-d of New York
Public Health Law); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2785-a(2) (McKinney 1996) (stating when
public health officer communicates test results to subject of test, officer shall directly pro-
vide test subject with counseling, or referrals for counseling, with regard to HIV disease
and testing and appropriate health care and support services, or referrals to such services);
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1996) (setting forth cause of action for lack of
informed consent). See also, e.g., Reed v. Campagnalo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1146 (Md. 1993)
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inform an injured party of medical risks prior to treatment2" 9 or
diagnosis.210 As to the elements of breach, causation and dam-
ages,2 1 1 an impaired infant faces the same problems faced in a
wrongful life action,212 while different considerations apply to the
standard of care.213
An additional obstacle for the New York plaintiff is the availa-
bility of several defenses to a lack of informed consent claim.2 14 A
defendant may show the risk involved was not commonly
known,21 5 or the defendant could not obtain consent from the
plaintiff.21 6 A defendant may also show the plaintiff indicated she
did not want to know of the risks,2 17 or would have undergone
treatment regardless of the risks.2 18 Finally, the defendant may
(alleging doctors failed to inform mother of need for prenatal testing that would reveal
birth defects); Bani-Esraili v. Wald, 127 Misc.2d 202, 203 485 N.Y.S.2d 708, 709 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1985) (claiming doctors misinformed mother of risk that child would develop
Thalassemia major).
209 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(3) (McKinney 1996) (providing person bringing
cause of action for lack of informed consent must establish reasonably prudent, fully in-
formed, patient would not have undergone treatment); see also Flores v. Flushing Hosp.
and Med. Ctr., 176 A.D.2d 843, 848, 490 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (1st Dep't 1995) (listing ele-
ments of informed consent action in New York).
210 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(3) (McKinney 1996) (providing that cause of action
requires proof lack of informed consent was be proximate cause of injury).
211 See generally PROSSER, supra note 27, at 121 (defining elements of negligence action).
See, e.g., Moore v. Blanchard, 43 So. 2d 599, 601 (La. 1949) (discussing element of
damages).
212 This Note concludes that a wrongful life plaintiff can prove there is a duty to an
unborn child, that a health care provider breached that duty and that a jury may ascertain
damages. These conclusions also apply in a lack of informed consent action.
213 See Yonce v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Lab., Inc., 680 A.2d 569, 583 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1996) (noting lack of informed consent is based on negligence principles); see
also Bani-Esraili, 127 Misc.2d at 203, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (analyzing lack of informed
consent in negligence context); Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 490 (noting failure to depart informa-
tion as to risks of proposed treatment is negligence).
214 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(4) (McKinney 1996) (establishing that certain de-
fenses are available to defendant).
215 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(4)(a) (McKinney 1996) (allowing defense if "risk not
disclosed is too commonly known to warrant disclosure").
216 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(4)(c) (McKinney 1996) (allowing defense if"consent
by or on behalf of the patient was not reasonably possible").
217 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(4)(b) (McKinney 1996) (allowing defense if patient
indicated he or she did not want to learn risks).
218 See N.Y. PUB. HEAMTH LAw § 2805-d(4)(b) (McKinney 1996) (allowing defense if pa-
tient assures health care provider he or she would undergo treatment, regardless of risk
involved); see also Bernard v. Block, 176 A.D.2d 843, 848, 575 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511 (2d Dep't
1991) (stating that for doctor to be liable for failure to obtain patient's informed consent to
procedure, plaintiff must sustain burden of proof on three issues, including that reasonable
person in plaintiffs condition would have opted against procedure); Sollazzo v. Edelman,
142 A.D.2d 572, 573, 529 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908 (2d Dep't 1988) (stating that defenses in N.Y.
Public Health Law 2805-4 are affirmative defenses); Grossman v.Osteopathic Hosp. &
Clinic of New York, 121 Misc.2d 533, 534, 468 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1983) (stating that defense to any action for medical malpractice based upon failure to
obtain informed consent that patient assured medical practitioner he would undergo treat-
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show he or she used reasonable discretion when evaluating the
effect of disclosure of risks on the patient's condition.219 Each of
these defenses addresses breach of a standard of care,22 ° which a
plaintiff must defeat. It is submitted that an HIV-positive infant
has a cause of action for lack of informed consent2 21 if the infant's
injury stems from a health care provider's failure to recommend
that her mother take an HIV test.222
A. Recommending an HJV Test: A Standard of Care
Courts are undecided as to what constitutes a reasonable stan-
dard of care in lack of informed consent cases.223 In many HIV-
ment, procedure or diagnosis regardless of risk involved, or patient assured medical practi-
tioner that he did not want to be informed of matters to which he would be entitled to be
informed). See generally Thomas R. Eller, Informed Consent Civil Actions for Post-Abortion
Psychological Trauma, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 639, 643-68 (1996) (discussing adequacy of
informed consent for objective determination and noting ultimate factual, and subjective,
question will be whether reasonable person in plaintiffs situation would have undergone
abortion if physician properly informed her of probability of psychological harm to her).
219 See N.Y. PUBLIc HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(4)(d) (McKinney 1996) (allowing defense if
health care provider, after considering all attendant facts and circumstances, used reason-
able discretion to decide whether to disclose these alternatives or risks because practitioner
reasonably believed disclosure could be expected to adversely and substantially affect pa-
tient's condition); see also Grossman, 121 Misc.2d at 534, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 328 (stating de-
fense to lack of informed consent action may be that medical practitioner used reasonable
discretion in disclosing considered alternatives or risks because of reasonable belief that
disclosure could adversely and substantially affect patient's condition). See generally Eller,
supra note 218, at 643-68 (discussing informed consent and physician's obligations to dis-
close information).
220 See, e.g., Blair v. Hutzel Hosp., 552 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
failure to inform mother of option of abortion breached standard of care); Monusko v. Pos-
tle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (finding it is foreseeable that failure to
immunize may result in rubella in pregnant patient, resulting in child with rubella syn-
drome); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966) (discuss-
ing that expert testimony established physicians had duty to inform mother of possibility of
defects to child when mother contracted German measles during her first trimester); Khan
v. HIP Hosp., 127 Misc.2d 1063, 1067-68 487 N.Y.S.2d 700, 704 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1985) (holding duty does not extend to unborn infant).
221 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805 (McKinney 1996) (setting forth lack of informed
consent action).
222 See, e.g., Anastosopoulos v. Perakis, 644 A.2d 480, 481 (Me. 1994) (discussing case
where physicians knew of patient's history of sexually transmitted disease, but never rec-
ommended HIV test); AIDS Educator Dies, But Son's Lawsuit Against Doctors Still On,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, June 3, 1995 [hereinafter AIDS Educator Dies] (reporting on Ms.
Anastosopoulos' death in 1995 and her claim that she led risky lifestyle before her preg-
nancy); Ripley, supra note 201 (reporting on Anastosopoulos case).
223 See, e.g., Reed v. Campagnalo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Md. 1993) (questioning
whether offering or performance of amniocentesis test was standard practice); Blair, 552
N.W. at 512 (finding when abortion is option by law, physician must furnish patients with
adequate information for them to be able to decide whether to abort); Johnson v. Yeshiva
Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 819, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 1341, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (1977) (conclud-
ing use of amniocentesis test was not standard practice in 1969); Duffey v. Fear, 121 A.D.2d
928, 930-31, 505 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139 (1st Dep't 1986) (questioning what was standard of care
as to removal of IUD, or disclosure of risks associated with IUD); Azzolino v. Dingfelder,
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related cases, the performance of an HIV test 224 was not a com-
mon standard of care at the time of treatment.225 Medical risks
relating to the virus were too speculative to hold a physician liable
for failure to disclose them to patients.226 In all medical malprac-
tice actions, courts also were concerned that expanding liability
would result in physicians performing a battery of unnecessary
tests to avoid risk of liability.227 New York228 requires a physician
337 S.E.2d 528, 530 (N.C. 1985) (dealing with standard of care regarding genetic counsel-
ing and availability of amniocentesis test). But see Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Defensive
Medicine And Tort Reform: New Evidence in an Old Bottle, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
267, 279 (1996) (stating that routine fetal monitoring is now standard of care).
224 See Renna, supra note 10, at 412-15. There are several tests available to test for HIV.
Id. The first are the Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) and the Western Blot.
Id. at 413-14. Both of these tests detect for the presence of antibodies to HIV in the blood
stream and are highly accurate. Id. The second is the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test.
Id. at 414. This test amplifies small quantities of HIV DNA to a detectable level and cannot
result in a false positive. Id. The p24 antigen test detects proteins found in the core of HIV.
Id. at 414-15. Finally, the IgA test detects for antibodies, like ELISA and the Western blot
tests. Id. at 415; see also Martha A. Field, Pregnancy and AIDS, 52 MD. L. REv. 402, 424
n.82 (1993). This article describes different tests for AIDS. Id. See generally Marianne Bur-
gard et al., The Use of Viral Culture and P24 Antigen Testing to Diagnose Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Infection in Neonates, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1194 (1992). The
authors offer a discussion of AIDS testing. Id.; Steven A. Miles et al., Rapid Serologic Test-
ing with Immune-Complex- Dissociated HIV P24 Antigen for Early Detection of HIV Infec-
tion in Neonates, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED 297, 299-300 (1993). This article offers a description
of HIV testing on infants. Id.
225 See Chambarry v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 161 Misc.2d 1000, 1002-03 615 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994) (refusing to consider what reasonable standards of HIV testing
and disclosure of results were in 1981); see also Hoemke v. New York Blood Ctr., 912 F.2d
550, 552 (2d Cir. 1990) (reasoning that in assessing medical negligence claim, court must
determine whether defendant acted in accordance with state of medical knowledge at time
of transfusion and not with benefit of hindsight or knowledge of subsequent developments);
Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F. Supp. 746, 750 (D.D.C. 1993) (discussing applica-
ble standards for disclosure of HIV test results in 1987 and 1988); Wolfe, supra note 98, at
1A (commenting that victory in Anastosopoulos case was ruling based on medical standard
of care).
226 See Williams v. Chameides, 603 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (noting, in
case where father claims physician negligently timed surgical procedure, plaintiff must
produce expert evidence sufficient to allow jury to determine applicable standard of care);
see also Evans v. Bernhard, 533 P.2d 721, 724 (Az. 1975) (stating that general practi-
tioner's testimony as to his usual personal practice was not sufficient to establish general
medical standard); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 88 (Me. 1974) (finding personal and
individualistic method of practice of doctor is not sufficient to establish reasonable basis for
any inference that he has departed from general medical custom and practice in commu-
nity, nor can it support conclusion that he was negligent in any regard by not following his
own usual procedure). See generally Lynn, supra note 104, at 388-89 (explaining that plain-
tiff in medical malpractice case must present expert testimony to establish applicable stan-
dard of care and deviation from that standard of care); Robert G. Miceli, M.D., J.D., Depri-
vation of Due Process for Physicians the 'Failure to Diagnose" Cause of Action, 33 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 859, 887-98 (1989) (discussing standards of care and medical malpractice).
227 See Bopp, supra note 25, at 486 (noting physicians tend to use defensive medicine in
face of increasing tort liability); see also Closen, supra note 82, at 476 (noting doctors have
been held liable for failing to warn others of contagious or dangerous conditions of pa-
tients); Boruschewitz v. Kirts, 554 N.E.2d 1112, 1113 (111. 1990) (discussing case where
husband sued wife's psychiatrist for doctor's detrimental treatment of wife, where she
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to disclose all reasonably foreseeable risks relating to medical
treatment to his or her patient.2 29 Whether a risk is reasonable
depends on whether competent health care providers in the medi-
cal community are generally aware of that risk.23 °
Limiting the discussion to when a physician is aware that his or
her patient is at higher risk for HIV,231 it is reasonably foresee-
able to that physician that the patient may be infected with HIV.
It is well known that certain behavior, such as promiscuity, intra-
venous drug use and unprotected intercourse,23 2 heightens the
risk for HIV-infection. 233 It is also foreseeable that an HIV-posi-
eventually killed two people). See generally Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, Reconcep-
tualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not
"Moral Monsters", 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 975, 1018 (1995) (discussing fear of liability and
physicians' reactions).
228 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1996).
Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person providing professional treat-
ment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reason-
ably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical, dental or podia-
tric practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner
permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.
Id. See generally Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 128-29 105 N.E. 92,
93-94 (N.Y. 1914) (discussing patient's right to physical integrity).
229 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1996) (setting forth lack of in-
formed consent action); see also Blair v. Hutzel Hosp., 552 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996) (noting physician must disclose enough information to allow mother choice as to
whether she will terminate pregnancy); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 489, 490
(Wash. 1993) (discussing duty imposed upon physician to disclose information regarding
risks); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) (defining negligence).
230 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1996) (setting forth lack of in-
formed consent action); see also Reed v. Campagnalo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1154 (Md. 1993) (find-
ing what is appropriate in any situation does not depend solely on plaintiffs, but requires
expert testimony and evaluation of all circumstances surrounding genetic counseling); see
also, e.g., McNeely v. M & M Supermarkets, Inc., 269 S.E.2d 483, 484-85 (Ga. 1980) (pre-
supposing standard of behavior under negligence); Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 469
P.2d 783, 785 (Or. 1970) (discussing reasonable care).
231 See, e.g., Anastosopoulos v. Perakis, 644 A.2d 480, 481 (Me. 1994) (discussing case
where physicians knew of patient's history of sexually transmitted disease, but never rec-
ommended HIV test); Aids Educator Dies, supra note 222 (reporting on Ms. Anastoso-
poulos' death in 1995 and her claim that she led risky lifestyle before her pregnancy); Rip-
ley, supra note 201, at A4 (reporting on Anastosopoulos case). But see Trowell v. United
States, 526 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (noting that plaintiffs own negligence is
not reasonable risk subject to compensation in negligence action).
232 See DuRant, supra note 2, at 59 (discussing knowledge of high school students as to
perceived risks of AIDS); see also Preventing HIVIAIDS, supra note 2, at 39 (addressing
various behavioral, social and economic forces that make adolescents more vulnerable to
AIDS epidemic).
233 See Durant, supra note 2, at 59. While generally the public is aware that certain
factors such as unprotected intercourse and intravenous drug use increase the risk for HIV
there are various misconceptions that certain harmless activity, such as mosquito bites and
donating blood, does increase the risk. Id.; see also Renna, supra note 10, at 411. The au-
thor discusses transmission of HV from mothers to unborn infants. Id.
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tive mother will pass the virus to her child.234 Public concern in
stopping the spread of AIDS 235 compels physicians to recommend
that their patients take an HIV test when the patient is at high
risk for the virus.
B. Defending Against the Lack of Informed Consent Action
New York provides four defenses to the lack of informed consent
action.236 First, the defendant may claim the risk was too com-
monly known to warrant disclosure. 237 Despite the attention fo-
cused on HIV and AIDS in the last decade,238 public knowledge
has not reached the level that the risks are too well known to war-
rant disclosure.239 Additionally, a defendant may argue the pa-
tient indicated he or she would have undergone medical treatment
regardless of the risks,24 ° or he or she did not want to know the
risks.241 This is a factual issue242 dependent upon whether a
234 See HIV Infection, supra note 3, at 2416 (noting most HIV-infected infants acquired
virus through vertical transmission from their mothers); see also Estimated Timing, supra
note 10, at 1330 (discussing transmission of HIV-1 from mother to child can occur during
pregnancy and at delivery, but frequency is unknown, though this study estimates that
one-third of infected infants are infected in utero and remaining are infected on day of
birth); Renna, supra note 10, at 411 (noting in 93% cases of HIV-positive children, trans-
mission was perinatal).
235 See Condoms Are All the Rage, supra note 83, at 44 (discussing controversial give-
away plans for condoms in hopes of preventing spread of AIDS); see also Closen, supra note
82, at 458 (discussing efforts by Surgeon General to inform Americans of AIDS and HIV
risk); Preventing HIVIAIDS, supra note 2, at 39 (recommending governmental leadership,
integrated adolescent programs, school staff training, health and education collaboration,
health care reform, research on adolescent health and media participation to increase
awareness of AIDS in adolescents).
236 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(4) (McKinney 1996) (providing that there are
several defenses to lack of informed consent action).
237 See N.Y. Pua. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(4)(a) (McKinney 1996) (allowing defense if"risk
not disclosed is too commonly known to warrant disclosure").
238 See Durant, supra note 2, at 59 (discussing public's awareness and misconceptions
about HIV-risk factors); see also Renna, supra note 10, at 411 (discussing transmission of
HIV from mothers to unborn infants).
239 See Preventing HIVIAIDS, supra note 2, at 39 (addressing numerous factors that
create barrier to effective AIDS prevention and recommending ways to combat problem).
240 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(4)(b) (McKinney 1996) (allowing defense if pa-
tient assured health care provider he or she would undergo treatment, regardless of risk
involved, or he or she assured practitioner that he or she did not want to know risks or
benefits).
241 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(4)(b) (McKinney 1996) (allowing defense if pa-
tient assured health care provider he or she would undergo treatment, regardless of risk
involved, or he or she assured practitioner that he or she did not want to know risks or
benefits).
242 See generally Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Taylor, 589 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992) (comparing role of jury as factfinder in different types of negligence actions);
Olivier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 207, 209 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (noting jury is factfinder
whose determinations can only be reversed if there was no reasonable factual basis for
finding or record establishes finding was clearly wrong); Vedros v. Massiha, 646 So. 2d
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mother wanted to know of her HIV status, or stated she would
conceive regardless of the test result. Third, a defendant may
claim consent was not possible,243 allowing a contention that an
unborn child was unable to consent to his or her own birth.
244
Courts, however, have invalidated this defense, as they accept a
mother's consent on behalf of an infant.245 Finally, New York
law246 permits the defendant to use reasonable discretion 247 in de-
termining whether disclosure of the risks would adversely affect
the patient.2 1s It is submitted that any adverse effects to a woman
who is told she is at high risk for HIV does not outweigh the tragic
consequences if the woman were to give birth to an HIV-infected
infant. Therefore, assuming a plaintiff proves the defendant had
no factually based defenses, lack of informed consent is an appro-
priate remedy for the HIV-positive infant.24 9
CONCLUSION
An infant infected with HIV due to the negligent administration
of an HIV test deserves a legal remedy in New York. Other juris-
1120, 1122 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing that when there are two permissible views of
evidence, factfinder's view cannot be erroneous).
243 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(4)(c) (McKinney 1996) (allowing defense if patient
did not reasonably consent).
244 See Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp. of Port Jervis, 92 A.D.2d 131, 134-35, 459 N.Y.S.2d
814, 817 (2d Dep't 1983) (discussing case where defendants claimed fetus in utero could not
give legal consent); see also Keselman v. Kingsboro Med. Group, 156 A.D.2d 334, 335, 548
N.Y.S.2d 287, 288-89 (2d Dep't 1989) (denying recovery for infant when there was no physi-
cal injuries to mother).
245 See Hughson, 92 A.D.2d at 134-135, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 817 (finding since adult patients
may have treatment authorized by other competent individuals, pregnant mother may pro-
vide unborn child's consent). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (demonstrat-
ing mother's control over fetus); Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (showing parents have right to disconnect baby in vegetative state from
ventilator).
246 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d (McKinney 1996) (providing cause of action for
lack of informed consent).
247 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(4)(d) (McKinney 1996) (noting physicians may
use reasonable discretion).
248 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw §2805-d(4)(d) (McKinney 1996) (allowing defense if health
care provider, after considering all attendant facts and circumstances, used reasonable dis-
cretion to decide whether to disclose alternatives or risks, considering how such disclosure
could reasonably, adversely and substantially affect patient's condition); see also Yonce v.
Smithkline Beecham Clinical Lab., Inc., 680 A.2d 569, 583-84 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)
(acknowledging right to withhold information under certain circumstances).
249 See generally Olivier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 207, 209 (La. Ct. App. 1995)
(discussing strict standards of review necessary to reverse factfinder's determinations);
Vedros v. Massiha, 646 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (noting when there is conflict
in testimony, appellate court will not disturb fact-finder's reasonable review of credibility);
Byrne v. Bercker, 501 N.W.2d 402, 412 (Wis. 1993) (discussing that role ofjury is to deter-
mine facts, credibility of witnesses and validity of evidence).
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dictions would allow such infants to recover extraordinary ex-
penses under a wrongful life action. In New York, the wrongful
life plaintiff may prove the elements of negligence, including cal-
culation of damages, necessary to support a wrongful life claim.
Public policy concerns over the spread of AIDS compel resolution
of the traditional arguments against wrongful life claims in favor
of the HIV-positive infant.
Further, if a physician is aware a patient is at high risk for HIV,
yet fails to recommend the patient take an HIV test, a subse-
quently born HIV-positive infant should have a cause of action
under New York's lack of informed consent statute.
A court's refusal to examine anew the traditional arguments
against wrongful life and lack of informed consent actions in light
of the AIDS epidemic would be contrary to public policy concerns.
This devastating epidemic claims numerous victims daily, the
most innocent of which are HIV-infected infants. These infants
are not responsible in any way for their illness and suffer short,
tortured lives. If a health care provider is the party responsible for
causing the illness, he or she is less innocent than the infant and
should not be relieved of liability.
Tara C. Fappiano
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